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Summary 
Based on the intergroup emotion theory (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007) group-based 
humiliation, its emotional and behavioural consequences as well as the role of ingroup 
identification were studied in three experiments using the intergroup context of gender. The 
results of all three experiments supported the hypothesis that group-based humiliation can 
indeed be experienced and this experience is different from personal humiliation (H1). 
Moreover, the results of Experiment 2 and 3 supported the hypotheses that group-based 
humiliation accommodated by the feeling of anger results in revenge (H3) whereas group-
based humiliation accommodated by the feeling of shame results in withdrawal (H4). 
Experiment 3 aimed to test the hypothesis that the degree of ingroup identification predicts 
the degree of group-based humiliation (H2). However, the findings with regard to ingroup 
identification were rather ambiguous. The implications of the present research are outlined in 
detail with regard to the current discourse on intergroup emotions. 
 
Keywords: Group-based humiliation, shame, anger, withdrawal, revenge, ingroup 
identification 
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Abstract 
Humiliation is a negative, self-conscious emotion that is experienced because of a 
psychological discrepancy between an individual’s self-concept and how s/he perceives 
others as viewing him/her. The questions addressed in the present research were whether 
humiliation can be experienced as a group-based emotion, what are the emotional and 
behavioural consequences, and what role does ingroup identification play? In line with the 
intergroup emotion theory (Smith et al., 2007) and related research, three experiments were 
conducted to address these questions. The results showed that participants reported to feel 
humiliation on behalf of a humiliated ingroup member. The results further implied that the 
behavioural responses such as withdrawal and revenge to group-based humiliation depend on 
the accommodating emotions such as shame and anger. The results addressing the role of 
ingroup identification were rather ambiguous. The implications of the present research are 
outlined in detail with regard to the current discourse on intergroup emotions.  
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Introduction 
Feeling humiliated is an intense and deeply distressing experience (Otten & Jonas, 
2014; Palshikar, 2005). It is the degrading treatment at the hands of others (Klein, 1991) and 
it is prevalent in society as it is universally experienced by all human beings, both on an inter-
individual (Elison & Harter, 2007) and inter-group level (Jonas, Otten, & Doosje, 2014; 
Lacey, 2009; Leidner, Sheikh, & Ginges, 2012; Saurette, 2006). On an individual level, 
humiliation has been linked to depression (Farmer & McGuffin, 2003), suicide and mass 
murder (Klein, 1991), including school shootings (Elison & Harter, 2007). On a group-level,  
it has been suggested that this negative, self-conscious emotion is directly linked to 
intergroup conflicts that have been seen in the world (McConochie & Leung, 2010), 
including the genocide in Rwanda (Gasanabo, 2006;  Lindner, 2001), the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict in Gaza (Atran & Ginges, 2008), the Holocaust of the second world war (Lindner, 
2001), and the unrest in Northern Ireland (Stokes, 2006). The outlined examples suggest that 
humiliation may be experienced as a group-based emotion, meaning that it is experienced on 
behalf of other ingroup members who are humiliated by an outgroup. Yet, humiliation 
experienced on a group-level has been subjected to relatively little empirical studies (Torres 
& Bergner, 2010). If there is indeed a linkage between humiliation experienced on a group-
level and violent intergroup conflicts, then more empirical studies are needed in 
understanding this painful and seemingly destructive emotion.  
The present research project aimed to add to the understanding of humiliation 
experienced on a group-level by experimentally studying the possibility that humiliation can 
be indeed experienced on behalf of another ingroup member. Using the intergroup emotion 
theory (Smith et al., 2007) as theoretical background, the present research aimed to explore 
whether or not personal-level humiliation and group-level humiliation are two distinct 
phenomena. Moreover, the study explored the emotional and behavioural responses that are 
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associated with humiliation, namely shame, anger, withdrawal and revenge. Lastly, the 
present research aimed to explore the role of ingroup identification in the experience of 
group-based humiliation. 
Conceptualisation of Humiliation  
Humiliation is an emotion that leaves an individual feeling degraded and put down 
(Hartling & Luchetta, 1999). It is experienced when there is a discrepancy between the 
individual’s internalised standards, goals and rules and how the individual perceives others as 
seeing him/her (Miller, 1995). The individual feels that s/he is seen as less than s/he would 
want to be seen as and that his/her significance is undervalued by others (Fisk, 2001). In other 
words, there is a discrepancy between how the individual views himself/herself and how s/he 
perceives others are viewing him/her (Besser & Zeigler-Hill, 2010; Fisk, 2001; Hartling & 
Luchetta, 1999).   
Human beings have an innate need to feel that they are significant and valued in the 
eyes of others (Fisk, 2001). When the individual perceives or appraises others’ actions or 
behaviour towards him/her as devaluing his/her self-esteem and sense of ‘self’, and as 
lessening his/her significance that s/he believes to have, humiliation is possibly elicited 
(McCarley, 2009). Because it is others’ actions or behaviour that is causing this emotion, 
humiliation is interpersonal rather than internal to the individual (Fisk, 2001; Hartling & 
Luchetta, 1999). Klein (1991) coined the term ‘humiliation dynamics’ to describe humiliation 
and suggested that humiliation is an interplay among a humiliator, a victim and a witness. In 
this line, a situational factor that seems to elevate the experience of humiliation is the 
presence of an audience. Empirical evidence suggests that the overall feeling of humiliation is 
stronger with an audience present compared to its absence (van Driel, 2011). When the 
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audience is laughing, compared to being silent witnesses to the humiliating act, the 
experienced humiliation increases (Jonas et al., 2014). 
Humiliation seems to be a very intense emotion as compared to other emotions as was 
shown in a study conducted by Otten and Jonas (2014). This study focused on the neuro-
cognitive aspect of humiliation. The electro-encephalogram recorded from participants, who 
were reading humiliating scenarios, showed that the electro physiological measures of 
cognitive intensity were higher compared to participants who were reading happiness or 
anger evoking scenarios. Late positive potential (LPP), which is a measure of the level of 
perceived (negative) affect, was increased in humiliation scenarios compared to happiness 
and anger scenarios (Otten & Jonas, 2014). 
Humiliation, along with shame, guilt and embarrassment, is a negative self-conscious 
emotion (Elison & Harter, 2007; Walker & Knauer, 2011). Self-conscious emotions depend 
on the development of a number of cognitive skills, such as the ability to represent the ‘self’ 
as a mental representation of the ‘me’ (Lewis, 2011). It is this ability to have a sense of the 
‘self’ that differentiates humans from animals and may mediate the relationship between an 
emotion-eliciting event, or environmental stimulus, and its emotional response as self-
conscious emotion (Tracy & Robins, 2007). The elicitation of a self-conscious emotion 
involves self-evaluative processes which are the evaluation of the ‘self’ against one’s 
internalised standards, rules and goals. An individual acquires these standards, rules and 
goals in part through universal moral laws and in part through acculturation, as well as 
through the influence of family and peers (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Although 
standards, rules and goals can vary across societies and groups, across different historical 
periods and among individuals of different ages, each individual has acquired his/her own set 
of standards, rules and goals that is appropriate to his/her unique circumstances and 
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experiences (Lewis, 1995). There are several similarities and differences between humiliation 
and other negative, self-conscious emotions, which will be discussed next. 
Shame and humiliation are often used interchangeably (Walker & Knauer, 2011). 
Although both emotions imply a threat to the ‘self’, distinction seems to be the external and 
internal attributions given to the emotion eliciting event. Humiliated individuals do not feel 
that they deserve this negative feeling, they feel that this devaluation of the ‘self’ is unfair 
and unjust (Fernandez, Saguy, & Halperin, 2015). As Klein (1991) noted, “people believe 
that they deserve their shame; they do not believe they deserve their humiliation” (p. 117). 
Therefore, blaming others for the emotion-eliciting event (Gilbert, 1997; Silfver-Kuhalampi, 
Figueiredo, Sortheix, & Fontaine, 2015), and feeling one has done nothing to deserve this 
negative feeling (Klein, 1991; Silver, Conte, Miceli, & Poggi, 1986) seems to also elevate the 
experience of humiliation. Moreover, the cause of the event is associated with external, rather 
that internal attributions of responsibility for a loss of status or a loss of social desirability 
(Gilbert, 1997; Jackson, 2000). Shame, on the other hand, is associated with internal 
attributions of responsibility (Tracy & Robins, 2007). When one feels shame, one tends to 
engage in self-blame for one’s own transgressive behaviour. A shamed person focuses on 
negative self-evaluations of the global self and is elicited when the individual fails to live up 
to his/her core values. In other words, the individual experiences shame in situations where 
s/he perceives a trait of himself/herself as severely undermining one or more of the values 
they hold that in part define their identity (Allpress, Brown, Giner-Sorolla, Deonna, & 
Teroni, 2014). 
When an individual experiences guilt, s/he also engages in self-blame. In other words, 
there is also an internal attribution of blame (Neumann, 2000). The difference is that the 
focus is not on the total or stable self as is the case during the elicitation of shame, but rather 
on his/her own behaviour (Allpress et al., 2014). From an interpersonal perspective, guilt and 
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humiliation both involve a transgression against another (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999). The 
difference is that with guilt it will be the transgressor that experiences the guilt and not the 
victim, as is the case during the elicitation of humiliation (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999). Yet, it 
might be that over time humiliation might lead to a feeling of guilt as the victim blames 
himself/herself for his/her powerlessness and inability to protect himself/herself from the 
humiliation causing event (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999). 
As with humiliation, embarrassment is associated with the internalisation of a 
devalued ‘self’. With these two emotions the difference is that with humiliation the individual 
appraises the devaluating event as unjust and unfair (Fernandez et al., 2015). During the 
elicitation of embarrassment there is also an internal attribution of blame as there is with 
shame and guilt (Pulham, 2009). This emotion is often elicited after social blunders such as 
spilling or tripping where the individual might feel s/he has little control over. Therefore, 
although the individual blames the ‘self’ for the event, s/he doesn’t attribute a high level of 
blame because of the lack of control over the event (Pulham, 2009). It is less devastating and 
less painful and this negative feeling doesn’t last as long as shame and humiliation (Crozier, 
2014). Shame and humiliation lead to an decrease in self-esteem, but embarrassment does not 
(Crozier, 2014).  
A further difference between humiliation and other negative, self-conscious emotions 
seems to lie in the types of norms that are violated before the elicitation of these emotions 
(Pulham, 2009). There are two types of norm violations that seem to be relevant to negative, 
self-conscious emotions, namely moral and social norm violations (Dubreuil & Grégoire, 
2013; Pulham, 2009). Moral norms are mostly about harm, rights and injustice and their 
transgression is seemed as more serious than social norms (Turiel, 1983, 2008). Examples of 
moral norm violations would include stealing, hurting others emotionally or physically, and 
damaging property. Social norms, on the other hand, are socially shared, they become part of 
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our system of values and individuals usually feel an obligation to obey them (Bicchieri, 2006, 
2008). Examples of violating such norms would include undesirable actions (e.g., wearing the 
incorrect clothing and not bathing regularly), lack of ability (e.g., deficient in athletic ability), 
cognitive shortcomings (e.g., forgetfulness) or physical pratfalls (e.g., tripping, spilling food). 
This raises the question whether or not the emotion of humiliation is associated with moral or 
social norm violations? Humiliation seems to be more related to the violations of social 
norms (Harter, Kiang, Whitesell, & Anderson, 2003; McCarley, 2009). For instance, Harter 
et al. (2003) found that participants’ descriptions of humiliating events included wearing 
abnormal clothing or talking differently that caused laughter and insulting comments from 
others. Evidence from case histories revealed that children involved in school shootings were 
usually bullied and humiliated by their peers because of their appearance and/or lack of 
athletic ability (McCarley, 2009). 
Although humiliation mostly seems to be associated with social norm violations, 
empirical evidence exists that a moral norm violation can also lead to humiliation (Combs, 
Campbell, Jackson, & Smith, 2010). This only happens if there is a public condemnation of 
the violation (Combs et al., 2010). When a moral norm violation has been committed, the 
transgressor is likely to experience shame or guilt, but that these emotions are likely to 
become humiliation when there is a public exposure of the moral norm violation. This is 
because the individual feels that publicly condemning him/her is unfair and therefore s/he 
now attributes the blame for this negative feeling on others (Combs et al., 2010). The results 
of the Combs et al. (2010) study also showed that public condemnation, when intentional and 
severe, increased the experience of humiliation along with the negative consequences of 
anger, hostility, and vengeful urges, despite the fact that the humiliated person had 
transgressed in the first place. Further results showed that even at a minimal level, public 
exposure of a moral norm violation can lead to humiliation. When an individual was 
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reprimanded publicly by another person for a wrongdoing, humiliation was elicited (Combs 
et al., 2010). The research by Combs et al. (2010) added empirical evidence to the before 
mentioned notion that the presence of an audience seems to elevate the experience of 
humiliation.  
Although the presence of an audience, as well as the perception that the emotion 
eliciting event is unfair or unjust, appears to elevate the feeling of humiliation, the question is 
which events lead to or precede the elicitation of humiliation? How an individual appraises or 
evaluates an event or a situation differentiates the elicitation of one self-conscious emotion 
from another (Frijda, 1993; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). 
Events need to be appraised in a certain way for humiliation to be elicited. These are the 
cognitive appraisals or antecedents of humiliation which will be discussed next. 
Antecedents of Humiliation 
As mentioned before, how an individual appraises a situation or event plays a crucial 
role in the elicitation of emotions (Frijda, 1993; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Smith & 
Lazarus, 1993). According to the appraisal theory of emotion (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 
1989; Roseman, 1984), cognitive appraisals trigger specific emotional experiences. The 
appraisal theory of emotions explains why an event elicits one particular emotion and not 
another, in one particular individual under certain circumstances (Frijda, 1993). It is not the 
event itself that elicit a specific emotion, but how that event is appraised (Lazarus, 1991). 
Arousal of emotions is determined by the interaction between the event, the individual’s 
expectations as to what constitutes well-being for him/her, and the individual’s expectations 
that s/he will be able to deal with the event, as well as how s/he will deal with the event 
(Frijda, 1993). The latter is called the action tendencies or behavioural responses.   
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A negative emotion, such as humiliation, is elicited when the event is appraised as 
potentially harmful to the individual’s well-being (Smith & Lazarus, 1993). The emotional 
response serves to prepare and mobilise the individual to cope with the specific appraised 
harm in an adaptive manner. This can be done through avoidance, by minimising or 
alleviating an appraised harm. Whether certain circumstances are appraised as harmful 
depends on the individual’s specific standards, rules and goals (Smith & Lazarus, 1993). 
Appraisal therefore, creates the linkage between emotional and behavioural responses to 
environmental circumstances and personal standards, rules and goals. 
As mentioned before, when the individual perceives that his/her sense of ‘self’ is 
devalued by others or that the individual is seen as inferior, humiliation might possibly be 
elicited (Combs et al., 2010; Elison & Harter, 2007; Klein, 1992). Certain antecedents can 
determine whether events are perceived as devaluing an individual, and therefore cause 
humiliation. These antecedents are: (1) feeling disrespected by others (Trumbull, 2008); (2) 
social exclusion or rejection (Jonas et al., 2014; Veldhuis, Gordijn, Veenstra, & Lindenberg, 
2014); and (3) lowered status (Torres & Bergner, 2010). Each antecedent will be discussed in 
more detail in the following paragraphs. 
Disrespect 
Disrespect is often at the heart of controversies that are seen in society today, such as 
racism, sexism, ageism, homophobia, harassment, hate speech, political treatment and 
cultural wars (Miller & Savoie, 2002). In each of these examples, individuals feel that they 
are not recognised as belonging to the human community and that their identities are 
undervalued (Lalljee, Laham, & Tam, 2007). Disrespecting an individual means that the 
humiliator is ignoring a relevant aspect of that individual (Frankfurt, 1997). The individual 
feels that s/he is not seen in a manner that s/he views himself/herself – in other words, the 
 18 
  
individual feels that significant factors of himself/herself are overlooked and denied by others 
(Frankfurt, 1997).  
Each and every human is an autonomous being with his/her own rules, goals and 
values. By not regarding other individuals’ rules, goals and values with respect leads to the 
undervaluing of their integrity. Every individual seeks to be respected because to be respected 
is not only due to every person on the basis of him/her being human, but also dictates an 
individual’s worth in a community or a society (Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008). Based on 
this, Janoff-Bulman and Wether (2008) proposed that there are two types of respect, namely 
categorical respect and contingent respect. Categorical respect is intergroup in nature and 
based on an individual’s membership in an ingroup. To grant an individual categorical 
respect is to view him/her as a member of a common community and the individual is given 
the fundamental right to participate in the group – to have a voice and to be recognised as a 
member. Not feeling recognised as a member of an ingroup, be it a community group, a team, 
a larger ethnic or racial group, a nation, or the human community, makes an individual feel 
disrespected and devalued which leads to humiliation (Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008, p. 
10).  Lalljee, Laham and Tam (2007) call this unconditional respect – it is not conditional on 
an individual’s status or achievement, but is due to an individual simply because of being 
human. Unconditional respect implies the recognition of the equality of human worth – the 
recognition of the moral agency and autonomy of all humans (Lalljee et al., 2007). 
Contingent respect (Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008), on the other hand, is associated with a 
person’s standing in the group – it has to do with status in the group instead of inclusion. It is 
intragroup in nature as it is based on comparisons across group members rather than 
membership. Contingent respect is earned or achieved – it is based on an individual’s efforts, 
personal strengths, successes or contributions (Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008). Both types 
of disrespect are appraisals of humiliation. If an individual feels that s/he is not included in 
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the human community, or if s/he feels that his/her competencies or status are not seen or 
valued by others, then there is a discrepancy between how the individual views 
himself/herself and how s/he feels others are viewing him/her. It is this discrepancy, as 
mentioned before, that is at the heart of humiliation.  
Social Exclusion 
Linked to disrespect is social exclusion or rejection. If an individual is denied 
membership in a common community, the individual will feel not only disrespected but also 
socially excluded (Janoff-Bulman & Werther, 2008; Lalljee et al., 2007) which represents 
another antecedent which causes humiliation (Jonas et al., 2014; Veldhuis et al., 2014). Being 
excluded undermines people’s self-esteem and the ‘self’ (Bastian & Haslam, 2010). 
Belonging is very important to people’s experience of being human and exclusion may 
disrupt their sense of ‘self’ as members of the human community. Humans are social beings 
and feeling connected to other humans in society is very important for an individual’s well-
being (Putnam, 2001). Results of a study conducted by Jonas, Doosje and Song (2013), 
showed that simple exclusion from a group is sufficient to lead to the experience of 
humiliation (Jonas et al., 2014). When participants linked their exclusion to internal 
attributions, in other words, they felt that they were excluded because of their own abilities or 
personality traits, the feeling of humiliation was stronger (Jonas et al., 2014). In another study 
conducted by Veldhuis and colleagues (2014), similar results were found in that being 
rejected as inferior and not worth bothering with, elicited humiliation in participants 
(Veldhuis et al., 2014). 
Dehumanisation and infrahumanisation are forms of social exclusion and therefore 
lead to humiliation. Dehumanisation refers to the denial of the humanity of a person or group 
of persons (Oliver, 2011) and thus it refers to the denial of an individual’s ‘identity’ or 
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individuals’ ‘community’. It refers to an individual’s individuality and his/her belonging to a 
network of caring interpersonal relations. When these attributes are denied, individuals are 
dehumanised and seen as lacking the capacity to evoke compassion (Haslam & Loughnan, 
2014). Dehumanisation is an act of exclusion from a moral community that makes individuals 
indifferent to the suffering and unjust treatment of others (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). When 
individuals are placed outside the circle of humanity, it leads to humiliation, or in the words 
of Margalit: “Any treatment that does not accord Man his special place in the chain of being 
constitutes humiliation” (Margalit, 1996, p. 34). 
A subtler form of dehumanisation is infrahumanisation. Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, 
Leyens, & Giovanazzi (2003) describe three attributes that distinguish humans from animals, 
namely intelligence, language, and secondary or self-conscious emotions. Ascribing lesser 
secondary emotions that are unique to humans to outgroup members than to members of 
one’s own ingroup, is a subtle denial of the outgroup’s humanity (i.e., infrahumanisation). 
Members of the ingroup perceive themselves as having more human attributes than members 
of an outgroup (Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003), and the outgroup is 
therefore seen as less human. 
During both dehumanisation and/or infrahumanisation, people are placed outside the 
circle where human rights apply (Bastian & Haslam, 2010). Human rights are equally 
possessed by all humans exclusively by virtue of their humanity and are meant to protect 
human dignity (Margalit, 1996). Dignity is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as: “the state or 
quality of being worthy of honour or respect” (Waite & Stevenson, 2011). Human dignity is 
meant to distinguish humans from animals (Kaufmann, Kuch, Neuhauser, & Webster, 2011). 
It underlies the uniqueness of being human among all creatures, above all their decision 
making skills based on reason and free moral will (Kaufmann et al., 2011). Humiliation 
violates human dignity, because it is the devaluation of an individual or group that destroys 
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their right to equality in dignity (Hartling, Lindner, Spalthoff, & Britton, 2013). Individuals 
experience humiliation when treated as not having the same worth as the humiliator (Fisk, 
2001). Being recognised as an equal refers to equality at the level of shared humanity or 
dignity as a human being (Simon, 2007). 
Status Loss 
Another antecedent that leads to the experience of humiliation is the perception that 
one’s status is being lowered by an event (Otten & Jonas, 2014; Torres & Bergner, 2010; 
Walker & Knauer, 2011). An individual’s status is the key factor in determining which 
behaviours the individual is capable of. Statuses are the positions that are occupied by an 
individual in relation to all other aspects in his/her world including social and occupational 
roles (e.g., spouse to one’s partner, employee at one’s work) or disadvantageous positions in 
relation to significant others (e.g., victim of harassment on one’s workplace) (Torres & 
Bergner, 2010). Individuals make certain status claims in everyday life – in other words, they 
present themselves to others as legitimate occupants of certain social positions (e.g., “I am an 
honest and capable employee at my workplace”). Humiliation is elicited when an individual 
realises that this status claim is not recognised by others, that s/he failed to secure this status 
that s/he aspired to or lost the status that s/he previously had (Torres & Bergner, 2010). In 
other words, there is the discrepancy between how the individual views himself/herself and 
how s/he perceives others as viewing him/her with regard to his/her social position/status. 
According to Torres and Bergner (2010) there are three factors that seem to moderate the 
relationship between status loss and humiliation. First, when the status claim failed publicly, 
in other words, if it is witnessed by one or more other individuals, humiliation is elevated. 
Secondly, the status of the humiliator seems to play a role. If the status of the humiliator is 
seen as higher or more powerful than the humiliated individual’s status, humiliation is also 
elevated (Klein, 1991). Thirdly, when the humiliated individual feels ridiculed by others for 
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even considering making this particular status claim in the first place, humiliation is also 
elevated (Torres & Bergner, 2010). 
When these above mentioned antecedents elicit humiliation, the individual will 
engage in certain responses to rid or protect himself/herself from this negative emotion 
(Frijda et al., 1989). This is because this emotion is regarded as having the potential to cause 
harm or emotional distress to the individual (Smith & Lazarus, 1993). On an individual level, 
the appraisals of situations that lead to the emotion of humiliation seem to be related to a 
variety of emotional and behavioural responses. The experience of humiliation may cause an 
individual to seek safety by withdrawing or isolating himself/herself (Hartling & Luchetta, 
1999). Other responses include depression (Farmer & McGuffin, 2003; Walker & Knauer, 
2011), low self-esteem (Brown & Marshall, 2001; Gilbert, 1997; Hartling et al., 2013) and 
suicidal intention (Torres & Bergner, 2010). The feeling of being unfairly degraded also 
might lead to intense anger (McCarley, 2009) and aggression (Klein, 1992) which in turn 
leads to revenge tendencies (Gilbert, 1997; Walker & Knauer, 2011). An example of this is 
the school shooting cases where it was found that the shooters were humiliated on a regular 
basis by their peers (Elison & Harter, 2007).  
Summarising, one can say that humiliation is a negative, self-conscious emotion that 
seems to be elicited when the individual feels that his/her sense of ‘self’ (how s/he perceives 
himself/herself) and self-esteem are devalued by others (Elison & Harter, 2007; Fernandez et 
al., 2015; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Klein, 1992; Lindner, 2007). The individual 
experiences a discrepancy between his/her sense of ‘self’ and how s/he perceives others as 
viewing him/her (Miller, 1995). Cognitive appraisals or the antecedents that lead to this 
feeling of devaluation include feeling disrespected (Trumbull, 2008), feeling excluded 
(Besser & Zeigler-Hill, 2010; Otten & Jonas, 2014; Veldhuis et al., 2014) and feeling that 
one’s status is lowered (Torres & Bergner, 2010).   
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Situational factors that seem to play a moderating role between these antecedents and 
the elicitation of humiliation include firstly, the perception that the emotion eliciting event is 
unjust or unfair and that the individual has done nothing to deserve this treatment  (Elison & 
Harter, 2007; Fernandez et al., 2015; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Klein, 1992; Lindner, 2007). 
In other words, there is an external attribution of blame for the humiliating event (Gilbert, 
1997; Klein, 1991) – the individual doesn't blame himself/herself for this negative feeling. 
This seems to be one of the most important differences between humiliation and the other 
negative, self-conscious emotions like shame, guilt and embarrassment. During the 
experience of these emotions there seems to be an internal attribution of blame for the 
emotion eliciting event (Neumann, 2000; Pulham, 2009; Tracy & Robins, 2007). A second 
factor that seems to moderate the experience of humiliation is the presence of an audience 
(Combs et al., 2010; Hartling & Luchetta, 1999; Klein, 1992; van Driel, 2011), especially a 
laughing audience (Jonas et al., 2014). Lastly, it is important to note that humiliation seems to 
be elicited after both social and moral norm violations (Harter et al., 2003; McCarley, 2009). 
The elicitation of humiliation accompanies a variety of responses, including depression 
(Walker & Knauer, 2011), withdrawal (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999) and suicide (Elison & 
Harter, 2007) on the one hand, but also anger and revenge tendencies (Torres & Bergner, 
2010), on the other hand. 
So far, the experiences of humiliation as well as the responses have been discussed on 
an individual level. The question remains though, is it possible for an individual to experience 
humiliation on behalf of another ingroup member who is humiliated by an outgroup. The 
possibility of experiencing a group-based emotion, related theories and empirical evidence of 
group-based emotions will be discussed next which will inform the hypotheses tested in the 
present research project. 
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Group-Based Humiliation 
Although there are numerous studies that look at emotions experienced on a group-
level (Allpress, Barlow, Brown, & Louis, 2010; Allpress et al., 2014; Smith & Mackie, 
2016), experimental social psychological studies on group-based humiliation are scarce. 
Particularly social scientists have looked at humiliation experienced on a group-level. For 
instance, Neuhauser (2011) suggested that a group can be humiliated in three different forms: 
(1) direct group humiliation; (2) symbolic group humiliation; and (3) representative group 
humiliation. When a group is directly humiliated it means that members of a group are 
directly humiliated purely because they are members of a group (Neuhauser, 2011). 
Blackwood, Hopkins and Reicher (2013) describe how minority groups in the UK often 
experience this kind of group-based humiliation. Being born and raised in the UK, 
individuals from these groups will define themselves as British citizens, yet find themselves 
being treated in ways that are discrepant with what they expect on the basis of the self-
definition as members of the national ingroup (Blackwood et al., 2013). For instance, if a 
special section is opened at the airport for British citizens who appear to be Islamic because 
they are evaluated as being possible terrorists, then every individual who is moved to the 
special section will feel misrecognised and excluded, and this might lead to the experience of 
humiliation. This is because s/he sees herself/himself as a citizen that should be treated 
equally to all other citizens but perceives that s/he is not recognised as an equal who deserves 
the same rights as all others. This procedure can be seen as group humiliation as the 
individuals are humiliated purely because they are members of a particular group (Neuhauser, 
2011). 
A second way in which a group can be humiliated is through a symbolic act 
committed by an outgroup member or members. Not all members of the group are directly 
confronted with the humiliating acts, but instead, a symbol of the group is defiled and this 
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leads to a humiliation for all members of this group. In the case of symbolic group 
humiliation, there has to be a connection to a threat and it must be the intention of the 
humiliators to humiliate the ingroup. The threat is the rejection, or exclusion from humankind 
(Neuhauser, 2011). Ruining sacred burial grounds and burning a country’s flag are examples 
of this type of group humiliation. 
A third way a group can be humiliated is what Neuhauser (2011) terms representative 
group humiliation. This is the humiliation of one or more of its members (Neuhauser, 2011). 
Here, the first two ways of group humiliation can be combined. Individual members of a 
group are humiliated because they are members of a certain group, and this individual 
humiliation is seen as a symbolic act that humiliates other members, who identify with the 
group (Neuhauser, 2011). An example would be if several homosexuals are humiliated by 
another social group after leaving a club and the humiliation is described in the newspapers, 
then all homosexuals who read the article might feel humiliated even if they were not directly 
humiliated themselves.  
As argued before, during humiliation, an individual’s self-identity is brought into 
question because of the discrepancy that it creates between an individual’s self-identity and 
how s/he perceives to be viewed by others (Miller, 1993). The question now arises: Does the 
discrepancy between an individual’s social identity and how the individual experiences the 
outgroup viewing and/or treating members of his/her ingroup lead to the experience of 
humiliation? 
Smith, Seger and Mackie (2007) developed the theory on intergroup emotions that 
gives insight into how and when an individual might experience an emotion on behalf of the 
social group that s/he belongs to. The intergroup emotion theory combines insights from the 
social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the self-categorisation theory (Turner, Hogg, 
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Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and the appraisal theory of emotion (Frijda et al., 1989). 
According to the social identity theory group memberships become part of the ‘self’ because 
the groups that we belong to are part of our own identities.  Tajfel and Turner (1979) argued 
that human interaction ranges on a continuum from being purely interpersonal, on the one 
hand, to purely intergroup, on the other (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). A purely interpersonal 
interaction involves people relating entirely as individuals, with no awareness of social 
categories. A purely intergroup interaction is where people relate entirely as representatives 
of their groups, and where the individual’s distinctive, individualising qualities are overcome 
by the salience of his/her group memberships (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Moving from the 
interpersonal to the intergroup end of the continuum results in changes in how individuals see 
themselves and each other. At the intergroup end of the continuum, an individual’s self-
concept will mostly include one’s ‘social identity’, which are those aspects of an individual’s 
self-image that originate from the social categories to which s/he belongs, as well as the 
emotional and evaluative consequences of this group membership (Tajfel, 1981). 
Consequently, the more intense an intergroup conflict is, the more an individual is likely to 
behave according to his/her group membership than according to his individual 
characteristics or interpersonal relationships (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Based on the social identity theory, Turner and his colleagues developed the self-
categorisation theory (Turner et al., 1987). This theory tries to elaborate on the cognitive 
element of the social identity theory. According to the self-categorisation theory, when social 
identity is salient, the members of the group will cognitively represent themselves and other 
members in terms of models or prototypes of the group, rather than as unique individuals 
(Turner et al., 1987). The prototype is not an objective reality but a subjective belief of the 
defining attributes of the ingroup (Hornsey, 2008). When group identity is more relevant, 
individuals will attend more to group-level concerns. This is because members of the group 
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view their own characteristics as being similar to the characteristics that are seen as typical of 
the group and therefore, the ingroup and membership in this group, become part of the ‘self’ 
(Smith & Henry, 1996). Research by Smith and Henry (1996) looked at this assumption by 
using a method adapted from Aron, Aron, Tudor and Nelson (1991). Aron et al. (1991) 
developed a response time measurement technique that can provide more direct evidence of 
the cognitive representation of the ‘self’ and used it to show that a close relationship partner 
becomes part of the ‘self’. Reports on the self-descriptiveness of various traits are inhibited 
for traits on which the partner mismatches the ‘self’ and facilitated for traits where matches 
exist ( Aron et al., 1991). Smith and Henry (1996) hypothesised that if the ‘self’ and a group 
are combined within the same mental representations then any similarities between the traits 
of the ‘self’ and the group will haste and facilitate interpretations about the ‘self’. The authors 
showed that ingroup traits that matched the ‘self’ lead to faster responses and a smaller 
proportion of errors compared to ingroup traits that were not similar to the individual’s self-
concept (Smith & Henry, 1996). 
The intergroup emotions theory (Smith et al., 2007) adds to the social identity and 
self-categorisation theories by elaborating on the emotional aspect of social identities. This 
theory proposes that when individuals identify with a group and the ingroup becomes part of 
the ‘self’, social and emotional significance are achieved. When an ingroup reaches such 
significance, events that impact on the ingroup are appraised for their emotional relevance, 
just like events that occur in an individual’s personal life (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). 
Therefore, group-based emotions are elicited as a result of appraisals of events or experiences 
on a group level. The individuals involved need to have a level of identification with the 
ingroup and this is likely to happen when contextual factors make certain group identities 
salient and shift the situation from being interpersonal to intergroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
The group then functions as part of the ‘self’ and events that are appraised as self-relevant 
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elicit certain emotions (Smith et al., 2007). When an individual’s group membership has 
become part of the individual ‘self’, then events that harm or benefit the group also harm or 
benefit the individual’s ‘self’. According to the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) 
and the self-categorisation theory (Turner et al., 1987), when an individual attaches a lot of 
importance to the ingroup it would mean that the individual is less likely to accept any 
negative information about that ingroup. Individuals might not be personally affected or 
concerned with an event, but they are experiencing emotions because their ingroup or 
members of their ingroup are affected by a certain event (Smith et al., 2007).  
The intergroup emotion theory suggests that positive or negative comments made 
about your group might elicit emotional reactions that are as strong as those elicited by 
similar personal-level comments, especially if those comments reveal stereotypes or 
prejudices that the speaker holds about an individual’s ingroup (Garcia, Miller, Smith, & 
Mackie, 2006). The theory further proposes that for emotions to be experienced by 
individuals on a group-level, purely because of their social identity, four criteria are present: 
(1) group-based emotions are distinct from the same person’s individual-level emotions; (2) 
group-based emotions depend on the person’s degree of group identification; (3) they are 
socially shared within a group; and (4) they contribute to regulating intragroup and intergroup 
attitudes and behaviour (Smith et al., 2007). 
Several studies have added evidence to the intergroup emotion theory and its four 
criteria by looking at the possibility that emotions can be experienced on a group-level. 
Reliable differences were found between emotions experienced on an individual level and 
emotions experienced on a group level such as guilt and anger, suggesting that group-based 
emotions are distinct from personal-level emotions (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & 
Manstead, 1998; Smith et al., 2007; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). As 
mentioned before, experimental evidence of the possibility of group-based humiliation seems 
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to be scarce. One of the few experimental studies on group-based humiliation was conducted 
by Veldhuis et al. (2014) who tested the hypothesis that individuals can experience 
humiliation, powerlessness and anger when they observe other ingroup members being 
humiliated. These authors used the antecedent of rejection, or social exclusion, as a means of 
inducing feelings of humiliation, and the minimal group paradigm1 was used as a means of 
setting the intergroup context. They found that witnessing another ingroup member being 
excluded, elicited feelings of humiliation, anger and powerlessness. Witnessing a member of 
the outgroup being excluded did not lead to the same degree of humiliation as witnessing an 
ingroup member being rejected. The latter suggested that feeling humiliated on behalf of 
others was confined to ingroup members only. Results also showed that the experience of 
group-based humiliation was as intense as the experience of personal humiliation (Veldhuis 
et al., 2014). The present experiments aimed to add to our understanding of group-based 
humiliation. Different to the studies of Veldhuis et al. (2014), the present experiments were 
conducted within a real intergroup context and used the antecedents of disrespect and 
lowered status as a means of inducing humiliation. In line with the intergroup emotion theory 
it was firstly hypothesised that personal-level humiliation is distinct from group-based 
humiliation (Hypothesis 1). 
With regard to the second criterion of the intergroup emotion theory, empirical 
evidence was also found that group-based emotions are related to the individual’s level of 
ingroup identification (Doosje et al., 1998; Leach et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2007; Yzerbyt et 
al., 2003). Ingroup identification is the degree of value placed in a shared identity (Lickel, 
Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005). Research by Yzerbyt et al. (2003), indicated that 
individuals who identify strongly with the ingroup reported higher levels of anger, while the 
                                                          
1 The Minimal Group Paradigm is a methodology employed in social psychology to investigate the minimal conditions required for 
discrimination to occur between groups.  The groups are experimentally created based supposedly on the basis of trivial criteria (e.g., 
based on their results on a dot counting test). 
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opposite was found for research conducted on group-based guilt (Doosje et al., 1998). This 
might be due to the fact that high identifiers are more defensive and more willing to protect 
the ingroup when their ingroup’s unfavourable behaviour is made salient to them, thereby 
protecting their social identity (Doosje et al., 1998). The same trend might be found for 
group-based humiliation in that individuals who identify highly with their ingroup might 
reject the feeling of group-based humiliation because they want to protect the ingroup and 
keep their social identity in a positive light (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In line with this 
argument, it is worth mentioning the role of perceived ingroup variability. The same study by 
Doosje et al. (1998) showed that under the condition that the ingroup’s transgressions were 
presented ambiguously, highly identified participants reported more variability in ingroup 
past behaviour and ingroup members than low identified participants. High identifiers are 
more likely to challenge negative features of ambiguous information. On the other hand, 
participants who identified less with the ingroup were more likely to accept the negative 
features of their ingroup (such as transgressions committed in the past) and were therefore 
less likely to defend the image of the ingroup by emphasising its heterogeneity (Doosje et al., 
1998).   
Further looking at the role of ingroup identification, it might also be that individuals 
who strongly identify with their ingroup experience increased levels of group-based 
humiliation and not less as is the case with group-based guilt. This pattern might be most 
likely when participants perceive the treatment from the outgroup (that is causing damage to 
their social identity) as unfair of unjust. Consequently, one would expect that highly 
identified participants would experience more group-based humiliation than low identifiers 
(Hypothesis 2).  
Research addressing the third criterion of the intergroup emotion theory showed that 
individuals’ group emotions join toward a prototypical group emotion profile and that these 
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group emotion profiles seem to be indeed shared among group members (Smith et al., 2007). 
The fourth criterion of the intergroup emotion theory proposes that group-level emotions 
contribute to regulating intragroup and intergroup attitudes and behaviour (Smith et al., 
2007). Yzerbyt et al. (2003) showed that group-level emotional experiences were 
differentiated and mediated specific behavioural responses. In line with these findings, 
studies have shown that group-level anger, for instance, predicted desires to attack and 
confront members of an outgroup (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith et al., 2007). 
As mentioned before, according to the appraisal theory of emotion (Frijda et al., 
1989), how events are appraised or evaluated will determine which emotional responses and 
behavioural tendencies are triggered. Because the social groups that individuals belong to 
become part of the ‘self” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), events that are appraised as harming the 
ingroup also harm the individual’s ‘self’ and therefore elicit certain emotional responses and 
behavioural tendencies for the individual (Smith et al., 2007). On a group-level, humiliation 
seems to be associated with anger and aggression which can lead to retaliation and vengeful 
behaviour, but also to withdrawal and avoidance from the situation that is causing the 
humiliation (Elison & Harter, 2007; Hartling et al., 2013; Jackson, 2000; Jonas et al., 2014; 
Klein, 1992; Miller, 1993). 
Empirical evidence demonstrated that participants primed with humiliation reported 
relatively low levels of guilt and relatively high levels of other-directed outrage (like anger, 
but unlike shame); and relatively  high levels of powerlessness (like shame, but unlike anger) 
(Leidner et al., 2012). This is due to the fact that individuals who are humiliated are prone to 
attribute blame for their negative feelings to others and they feel that the event that is causing 
the humiliation, is unfair and unjust (Leidner et al., 2012; Silfver-Kuhalampi et al., 2015). 
The appraisal of injustice often elicits anger (De Cremer, Wubben, & Brebels, 2008; Frijda et 
al., 1989). Thus, results of studies conducted by van Driel (2011) and Veldhuis et al. (2014) 
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indicated that participants primed with group-based humiliation reported higher levels of 
anger compared to participants who were primed with personal-level humiliation. Actually, 
participants in the condition of personal-level humiliation reported higher levels of shame 
(van Driel, 2011).  
With regards to the action tendencies or behavioural responses to humiliation, 
individuals either withdraw from the situation or retaliate against the humiliator, depending 
on situational factors (van Driel, 2011). As anger increases, so does the tendency to approach, 
which includes vengeful behaviour (van Driel, 2011). Several researchers link humiliation 
directly to retaliation (Hartling et al., 2013; Elison & Harter, 2007). The feeling of outrage 
and anger that seems to accompany the experience of humiliation might lead to a desire to 
attack the source of the injustice, as this is the action tendency of anger (Leidner et al., 2012). 
When anger is combined with having enough resources as well as feeling strong enough to do 
something about the negative event, then action tendencies such as confronting and attacking 
seem likely (Niedenthal et al., 1994). In the same line, exclusion as an antecedent of 
humiliation leads to revenge tendencies as well (Otten & Jonas, 2013), and this relationship 
seems to be stronger if the participant perceives the humiliator’s intentions or behavior as 
deliberate (Jonas et al., 2014). Also important to note is that the relationship between group-
based humiliation and action tendencies, such as withdrawal and revenge, seem to be 
moderated by the prototypicality of the humiliated ingroup member (Jonas et al., 2014). 
Participants who perceived the ingroup member as prototypical reported increased 
withdrawal and revenge tendencies compared to participants who perceived the humiliated 
ingroup member as non-prototypical  (Jonas et al., 2014). This relationship was even stronger 
if the humiliator was perceived as having a violent reputation  (Jonas et al., 2014). Another 
situational factor that seems to moderate the relationship between humiliation and revenge 
tendencies is the presence of an audience (van Driel, 2011). This moderation seems to 
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become stronger when humiliated by a person or group of a lower status, where individuals 
then perceive the humiliating act as perhaps more unfair and undeserved (van Driel, 2011). 
When participants felt humiliated by someone from a higher status group, the tendency to 
avoid and withdraw from the situation increased (van Driel, 2011). This might be due to the 
fact that when humiliated by a higher status group, individuals might perceive the humiliation 
as more deserved and the individual perhaps also feels too weak and lacking in resources to 
retaliate (Niedenthal et al., 1994).   
Based on the fourth criterion of the intergroup emotion theory and with regard to the 
responses of humiliation, the present research tested the following hypotheses: The 
relationship between group-based humiliation and vengeful behaviour is mediated via anger 
but not shame (Hypothesis 3), whereas the relationship between group-based humiliation and 
withdrawal is mediated via shame but not anger (Hypothesis 4). 
In conclusion, the aim of the present research project is to shed light on the following 
questions: Is it possible to experience humiliation on behalf of another ingroup member? Is 
there a difference between personal-level humiliation and group-based humiliation 
(Hypothesis 1 tested in Experiment 1 and 2)? What is the interplay between ingroup 
identification and group-based humiliation (Hypothesis 2 tested in Experiment 3)? And 
finally, what are the emotional and behavioural responses to group-based humiliation 
(Hypotheses 3 and 4 tested in Experiment 2 and 3)? These four questions are at the heart of 
the present research project and were addressed in three experiments. 
The Present Research 
Three experiments were conducted using the online platform Qualtrics. In all three 
experiments blind random allocation was generated by the Qualtrics platform where 
participants were allocated to one of four experimental conditions in a 2 x 2 factorial 
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between-subjects design. In Experiment 1 and 2 personal humiliation and ingroup member 
humiliation were each manipulated on two levels. In Experiment 3 ingroup identification and 
ingroup member humiliation were manipulated on two levels, respectively. The intergroup 
context used in all three experiments was gender. Males and females are natural and 
established groups with a history of interactions and relations. Participants in all three 
experiments were South African female students registered with the University of South 
Africa. 
It was assumed that exposing participants to a description of the outgroup’s 
disrespectful behaviour towards a member of their ingroup (i.e., ingroup member 
humiliation) would elicit feelings of group-based humiliation. If the outgroup’s behaviour 
towards the ingroup member was presented as neutral, less or no feelings of humiliation 
should be elicited. Thus the experience of group-based humiliation was manipulated by 
presenting ingroup members (females) either with a scenario where an ingroup member 
(another female) was devalued unfairly (i.e., high ingroup member humiliation condition) or 
a scenario where an ingroup member (another female) was neutrally treated by outgroup 
members (males) (i.e., low ingroup member humiliation condition). Disrespect and lowered 
status were used as the antecedents in the high ingroup member humiliation condition as 
means to make humiliation the most likely reaction.  
Because it is important to separate feelings of humiliation as a consequence of being 
personally humiliated by an outgroup member and feelings of humiliation that are the 
consequence of humiliating behaviour towards a fellow ingroup member, the influence of 
being personally humiliated by the outgroup was also studied (Experiment 1 and 2). Personal 
humiliation was manipulated in that participants were asked to either recall a humiliating 
interaction with man/men (i.e., high personal humiliation condition) or to recall a recent 
interaction with man/men (i.e., low personal humiliation condition). This manipulation was 
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used as it was considered more ethical to ask participants to write about an incident where 
they felt personally humiliated than to manipulate personal humiliation directly. 
It was assumed that personal humiliation involves the personal identity of participants 
whereas humiliation on a group-level involves their social identity. Thus it was predicted that 
there will be more feelings of group-based humiliation among participants who are exposed 
to information where a fellow ingroup member is humiliated than those who are presented 
with information where a fellow ingroup member is not humiliated and treated neutrally by 
the outgroup. It was also predicted personal humiliation without group-based humiliation will 
not affect group-based humiliation, whereas personal humiliation with ingroup member 
humiliation might lead to greater feelings of group-based humiliation. 
The procedures of all three experiments were the following. A link to the Qualtrics 
online platform was included in the emails that were sent to potential participants. In the 
opening paragraph of the email, participants were informed that the study is part of a research 
project headed by the School of Interdisciplinary Research at the University of South Africa 
and if the participant intended to participate s/he should read all information carefully. The 
participants were informed that we live in a society where we are part of various social 
groups that are determined by our ethnicity, our age, our income, gender etc. They were 
further informed that the aim of this study was to look at perceptions regarding gender 
groups. The participants were asked to answer the statements or questions as honestly as 
possible and they were informed that completion of the study should take approximately 
fifteen minutes. They were also informed that participation in the study was voluntary and 
that they could withdraw from the study at any given moment without any consequences. 
Anonymity was assured and participants were further informed that the results of the study 
would be analysed at a group level with the intention of publication in scientific journals. 
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Any foreseeable risks were included though it was clearly specified that no risks were 
anticipated. Consent to participate was indicated by clicking. 
On the first page of the study, participants were asked to indicate to which gender 
group they belong to. Although it was known that all potential participants were female as the 
study was sent to female participants only, this question aided in setting the ingroup context 
and ensured that participants paid attention to the categorisation context. On the next page the 
gender context was further made salient by informing the participant that she indicated that 
she is female and she was asked to give three short examples for why she is proud to belong 
to the group of women (Experiment 1 and 2). Participants in Experiment 1 and 2 were 
randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: (1) high personal and high ingroup 
member humiliation; (2) low personal and high ingroup member humiliation; (3) high 
personal and low ingroup member humiliation; or (3) low personal and low ingroup member 
humiliation. Participants in Experiment 3 were randomly assigned to one of the following 
four experimental conditions: (1) high ingroup identification and high ingroup member 
humiliation; (2) moderate ingroup identification and high ingroup member humiliation; (3) 
high ingroup identification and low ingroup member humiliation; or (3) moderate ingroup 
identification and low ingroup member humiliation.  
The experimental manipulations were followed by items that measured first, direct 
group humiliation (Neuhauser, 2011),(Experiment 1 and 2) and secondly, group-based 
humiliation (Experiment 1, 2 and 3) as dependent variables. After these two measures the 
emotional responses were assessed and next the behavioural intentions (Experiment 2 and 3). 
These measures were followed by the personal humiliation and ingroup member humiliation 
manipulation checks (Experiments 1, 2 and 3). Afterwards the following covariates were 
measured: perceived prototypicality of the ingroup member (Experiment 2 and 3), ingroup 
identification (Experiment 1 and 2), perceived ingroup variability and susceptibility to 
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feelings of humiliation (all three experiments). Participants were then asked whether or not 
they remembered what the aim of the present study was. Afterwards they were asked to 
indicate their age, what they are currently studying, in which country they reside and lastly, 
what nationality they are. After completing the study, participants were thanked for taking the 
time and effort to participate in the study. They were debriefed as to the real purpose of the 
study and anonymity and confidentiality were again assured. They were again informed that 
the results would only be analysed at a group level for scientific purposes. Participants could 
exit the study by clicking. 
Approval to conduct the experiments and the use of Unisa students as participants was 
granted by the Ethical Research Committee at the College of Graduate Studies as well as the 
Senate of Research and Innovation and Higher Degrees Committee at the University of South 
Africa. 
 
Experiment 1 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to provide empirical evidence that humiliation can 
indeed be experienced as a group-based emotion – that is on behalf of another ingroup 
member. The following hypothesis was tested: personal-level humiliation is distinct from 
group-based humiliation (Hypothesis 1). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
experimental conditions in a 2 (Personal humiliation: High vs. Low) x 2 (Ingroup member 
humiliation: High vs. Low) factorial between-subjects design. 
Sample 
A total of 84 black, female students registered at the College of Education at the 
University of South Africa participated in Experiment 1. Only black females were included in 
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the experiment as to avoid making the inter-racial context salient instead of the inter-gender 
context. South Africa is a context where different racial groups reside and the name of the 
humiliated ingroup member (Thandeka) in the scenario presented to participants might have 
created an inter-racial context for white, Indian or coloured participants. Seventy participants 
indicated their age which ranged between 19 and 52 years (Mage = 30.91, missing: 14). All of 
the participants indicated that they were South African, except four who indicated that they 
were non-South Africans. They all resided in South Africa, except three who indicated that 
they reside outside South Africa. Two participants identified the true aim of the experiment 
by suggesting that the study was looking at humiliation and were therefore excluded from the 
following analyses. The remaining 82 participants were distributed to the four experimental 
conditions as outlined in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Number of participants in the four experimental conditions, Experiment 1. 
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                                                   Level of ingroup member humiliation 
 Low High 
Low n = 23 n = 18 
High n = 18 n = 23 
  
Experimental Manipulations 
Personal humiliation  
For the manipulation of personal humiliation, participants had to write about an 
incident involving an interaction with the outgroup of males. For the high personal 
humiliation conditions, participants were asked the following: “Please tell us in a short 
paragraph of a recent interaction with a man or men, where you personally felt humiliated by 
his/their behaviour towards you”. Below this, participants were given a text box where they 
could type in their paragraph. In the low personal humiliation conditions, participants had to 
write about a neutral interaction with the outgroup of males where no humiliation was 
experienced: “Please tell us in a short paragraph of a recent interaction that you had with a 
man or men”. Below this, participants were given a text box where they could type in their 
paragraph. 
Ingroup member humiliation  
In the high ingroup member humiliation condition, participants were asked to read a 
scenario where another female was humiliated by the behaviour of males. Presenting 
participants with an extract to read has been successful in manipulating group-level emotions 
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such as guilt and anger (Doosje et al., 1998; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). For this first experiment 
the scenario was constructed to simulate the humiliation of an ingroup member. In an attempt 
to ensure a basic level of humiliation in the hypothetical situation, the scenario described 
disrespect, lowered status and the violation of a social norm (which are associated with 
humiliation). The instruction read: “Now, please read the following story that appeared on a 
news website a few months ago”. 
 
Famous Gymnast’s Interview Experience 
                                                                                                               07:41, SA, 
                                                                                        Monday 12 January 2015 
Gymnast, Thandeka Molefi, yesterday wrote on her sport’s blog where she talks about her 
experience when going for an interview for what she describes as “her dream job”. Thandeka 
won two medals in the 2012 Olympic Games and has won several other sports’ awards, 
including best new comer in sports in 2011. Thandeka has recently obtained a degree in 
journalism and was applying for a position as sport’s reporter at a local broadcasting 
corporation. Thandeka describes her interview experience as follows: “as I entered the 
interview room, I greeted the three male interviewers. They didn’t greet me back, did not 
even bother to look up from their notes. When one of the interviewers finally looked up, he 
just looked me up and down and asked me if I am applying for the position of the weather 
girl. I replied that I was applying for the position of sports reporter. The male interviewers 
smiled at each other. The one interviewer then told me that a girl’s job in sports is to put on 
short skirts, tight tops and carry pom-poms and that he doesn’t think that women could 
actually report on the happenings of the game. He continued to tell me that they can interview 
me for the position of weather girl, or perhaps the position of lifestyle reporter as those 
positions would suit me better, but certainly not for the position of sports reporter as there are 
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certain things that only men can do!” Thandeka says that she was so taken aback by their 
comments that she just walked out of the interview. She further wrote: “I have never been so 
humiliated in my whole life!” 
 
In the low ingroup member humiliation conditions, participants were asked to read a 
scenario where another female had a neutral interaction with males: “Now, please read the 
following story that appeared on a news website a few months ago”.  
 
Famous Gymnast’s Interview Experience 
07:41, SA, 
Monday 12 January 2015 
Gymnast, Thandeka Molefi, yesterday wrote on her sport’s blog where she talks about her 
experience when going for an interview for what she describes as “her dream job”. Thandeka 
won two medals in the 2012 Olympic Games and has won several other sports’ awards, 
including best new comer in sports in 2011. Thandeka has recently obtained a degree in 
journalism and was applying for a position as sports reporter at a local broadcasting 
corporation. Thandeka describes her interview experience as follows: “as I entered the 
interview room, I greeted the three male interviewers and they greeted me back. One of the 
interviewers asked me if I am applying for the position of the sport reporter and I replied that 
I was. The one interviewer then asked me several questions about my experiences and skills 
regarding the position and why I believed that I could be the best person for the job”. She 
further wrote: “I left the room feeling good about the interview”. 
The effectiveness of the manipulation of ingroup member humiliation using the 
outlined scenarios was tested in a pilot study (see Appendix A). 
 42 
  
Measurements 
All measurements reported below were pre-tested in a pilot study and accordingly 
adjusted (see Appendix A). Moreover, all items of the respective scales were randomly 
presented to each participant. Measures were presented to participants as described below. 
Dependent variables 
The present study distinguished two measures of humiliation as dependent variable.  
The first measure is direct group humiliation, which is being directly humiliated purely 
because an individual is a member of an ingroup as described by Neuhauser (2011). The 
second measure is group-based humiliation, that is feeling humiliated on behalf of the woman 
in the scenario that was presented to them in the ingroup member humiliation conditions. 
This type of group humiliation is termed representative group humiliation by Neuhauser 
(2011). Both scales consisted of five items developed for the present research (see Appendix 
A). For the development of the items, the cognitive appraisals or antecedents that elicit 
humiliation were used. Concepts from the Humiliation Inventory (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999) 
that measures personal humiliation were also taken into consideration and adapted for the 
present study. The five items included in the scale that measured participants’ feelings of 
being directly humiliated as member of the ingroup by the outgroup were: “As a woman, I 
feel disrespected by the behaviour that men show towards women”; “As a woman, I feel that 
my dignity is violated by the behaviour that men show towards women”; “As a woman, I feel 
humiliated by the behaviour that men show towards women”; “As a woman, I feel that I am 
not recognised as equal by the behaviour that men show towards women”; “As a woman, I 
feel devalued by the behaviour that men show towards women”. These five items formed a 
reliable scale (α = .94). The five items that measured the participants’ feelings or experiences 
of group-based humiliation  were: “As a woman, I feel disrespected by the behaviour that the 
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male interviewers showed towards Thandeka”; “As a woman, I feel that my dignity is 
violated by the behaviour that the male interviewers showed towards Thandeka”; “As a 
woman, I feel humiliated by the behaviour that the male interviewers showed towards 
Thandeka”; “As a woman, I feel not recognised as equal by the behaviour that the male 
interviewers showed towards Thandeka”; “As a woman, I feel devalued by the behaviour that 
the male interviewers showed towards Thandeka”. These five items also formed a reliable 
scale (α = .94). All dependent measures were presented on a 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (Clearly does not describe my feelings) to 5 (Clearly describe my feelings). 
 
Manipulation check measures 
For all the items used for the manipulation checks, the participants had to indicate 
their level of agreement on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Extremely).  
Three items were used to check if the manipulation for personal humiliation was successful: 
“In my recent interaction with a man or men that I wrote about, I feel that I was unfairly 
treated by him/them”; “In my recent interaction with a man or men that I wrote about, I feel 
that I was humiliated by him/them”; and “In my recent interaction that I wrote about, I feel 
that I was disrespected” (α = .84). 
For the manipulation check of ingroup member humiliation, the following three items 
were used: “During Thandeka’s interview, she was unfairly treated as a woman by the male 
interviewers”; “During Thandeka’s interview, she was humiliated by the behaviour of the 
male interviewers”; and “During Thandeka’s interview, she was disrespected” (α = .94). 
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Covariates measures 
Ingroup identification was measured using items based on the scale developed by 
Leach et al. (2008). Ten items were selected for the present study: “I feel strong bonds with 
women”; “I feel committed to women”; “I am glad to be a woman”; “I think that women 
have a lot to be proud of”; “I often think about the fact that I am a woman”; “Being a woman 
is an important part of how I see myself”; “I have a lot in common with the average woman”; 
“I am similar to the average woman”; “Women have a lot in common with each other”; 
“Women are very similar to each other” (α = .82). 
Perceived ingroup variability was measured using three items. Two items were 
adapted from Doosje et al. (1998) “Women are not all alike” and “Women differ from each 
other”.  A third item was added to improve the reliability of the scale: “Not all women should 
be treated the same way” (α = .50). The item “Not all women should be treated the same 
way” did not correlate well with the other two items (Corrected Item Total Correlation = .16). 
The two remaining items (“Women are not all alike”; “Women differ from each other”) 
however correlated significantly (r = .605, p < .01) and it was therefore decided to use these 
two items for the perceived ingroup variability variable when further analyses were 
conducted.  
Susceptibility to feelings of humiliation was measured using five items based on the 
antecedents of humiliation. These items were developed for the present research project in 
line with the Humiliation Inventory (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999). Susceptibility to feelings of 
humiliation was measured at a general level and therefore not tailored to a specific intergroup 
context. The items were: “In general, I easily feel humiliated”; “I often feel disrespected”; 
“Often, I do not feel recognised by others”; “I often feel devalued as a person”; and “Often, I 
feel that my dignity is violated by other people” (α = .85). 
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Results 
Preliminary analysis 
Manipulation checks 
In the first analyses the manipulation check for personal humiliation manipulation 
was tested. A two-way analyses of variance was performed on the personal humiliation 
manipulation check as dependent variable and personal humiliation and ingroup member 
humiliation were entered as independent variables. Results showed that personal humiliation 
had a significant main effect on the personal humiliation manipulation check, F(1, 78) = 6.18, 
p = .015, ƞp2 = .07, as well as ingroup member humiliation, F(1, 78) = 5.85, p = .018, ƞp2 = 
.07. The results further indicated that participants in the high personal humiliation condition 
(M = 3.32, SD = 1.17, n = 42) scored significant higher on the manipulation check than 
participants in the low personal humiliation condition (M = 2.56, SD = 1.40, n = 42). This 
means that participants appraised the event described by them as more humiliating in the high 
personal humiliation condition than in the low personal humiliation condition. There was no 
significant interaction between ingroup member humiliation and personal humiliation on the 
personal humiliation manipulation check, F(1, 78) = 0.11, p = .918, ƞp2 = .00. 
The two-way analyses of variance performed on the ingroup member humiliation 
manipulation check revealed that ingroup member humiliation had a significant main effect 
on the ingroup member humiliation manipulation check, F(1, 78) = 94.25, p < .001, ƞp2 = .55, 
and that personal humiliation had a marginal effect on the manipulation check, F(1, 78) = 
4.10, p = .046, ƞp2 = .05. By studying the means it can be seen that participants in the high 
ingroup member humiliation condition scored significantly higher (M = 4.20, SD = 0.87, n = 
41) on the manipulation check than participants in the low ingroup member humiliation 
conditions (M = 2.21, SD = 1.22, n = 43). This means that participants perceived the ingroup 
member as more humiliated in the high ingroup member humiliation condition than in the 
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low ingroup member humiliation condition. There was no significant interaction between 
personal humiliation and ingroup member humiliation, F(1, 78) = 0.124,  p = .725, ƞp2 = .002. 
The results of the manipulation checks confirmed the success of the personal and 
ingroup member humiliation manipulations in Experiment 1. 
 
Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 summarises the means, standard deviations, number of participants and the 
inter-correlations of the assessed variables. The descriptive statistics (see Table 2) revealed 
that there was a significant strong correlation between the two dependent variables, direct 
group humiliation and experience of group-based humiliation. As can be expected, there was 
also significant though moderate correlations between the susceptibility to feelings of 
humiliation and the two dependent variables. This suggests that how susceptible a person is 
to the experience of humiliation relates to direct humiliation, but also to the experience of 
group-based humiliation. These results correspond with the finding of McCarley (2009) who 
demonstrated that certain characteristics like lower self-esteem are related to an increase in 
the level of humiliation experienced. Ingroup identification did not correlate significantly 
with either of the dependent variables indicating that the level to which participants identified 
with the ingroup did not relate to their experience of direct group humiliation or group-based 
humiliation in the present experiment. Doosje et al. (1998) found that perceived ingroup 
variability relates to ingroup identification in the experience of group-based guilt. This 
pattern was however not found in the present experiment.  
As expected, the two manipulation checks correlated significantly with the dependent 
variables direct group humiliation, as well as group-based humiliation. Rather unexpectedly, 
the manipulation checks for personal humiliation and the ingroup member humiliation were 
significantly associated – although moderate. 
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Table 2. Means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-correlations of 
principle variables, Experiment 1 
 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mean 3.53 3.42 2.92 3.15 4.07 3.77 3.20 
SD 1.22 1.28 1.34 1.46 0.60 0.93 0.93 
n 82 82 82 82 78 77 75 
1 Direct 
group 
humiliation 
--- .753** .366** .293** .187 .085 .489** 
2 Group-
based 
humiliation 
 --- .334** .565** .197 .088 .305** 
3 Personal 
humiliation 
manipulation 
check 
  --- .324** .240* .204 .461** 
4 Ingroup 
member 
humiliation 
manipulation 
check 
   --- .055 .005 .156 
5 Ingroup 
identification 
    --- -.003 .213 
6 Perceived 
ingroup 
variability 
     --- -.088 
7 
Susceptibility 
to feelings of 
humiliation 
      --- 
 
Note: ** correlation significant at p < .01 level, * correlation significant at p < .05 level 
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Hypothesis Testing 
The hypothesis in Experiment 1 proposed that personal humiliation is distinct from 
group-based humiliation. A two-way between-groups analysis of variance (two-way 
ANOVA) was performed on the dependent variables, direct group humiliation and group-
based humiliation, separately. Personal humiliation and ingroup member humiliation were 
entered as the independent variables and ingroup identification, perceived ingroup variability 
and susceptibility to feelings of humiliation were entered as covariates.   
Direct group humiliation 
Ingroup member humiliation had a significant main effect on the direct group 
humiliation, F(1, 68) = 6.53 p = .013, ƞp2 = .08. This indicated that exposure to ingroup 
member humiliation significantly affected the degree to which participants experienced direct 
humiliation. Personal humiliation did not have a significant main effect, F(1, 68) = 0.03, p = 
.857, ƞp2 = .00. The two-way interaction between personal humiliation and ingroup member 
humiliation did not reach statistical significance on the dependent variable either, F(1, 68) = 
1.02, p = .316, ƞp2 = .02. Susceptibility to feelings of humiliation was the only covariate that 
had a significant main effect, F(1, 68) = 17.66, p < .01, ƞp2  = .20. Therefore, how prone 
participants were to humiliation seems to have influenced their experience of direct group 
humiliation. Table 3 shows the estimated marginal means of direct humiliation across the 
four experimental conditions (susceptibility to humiliation, ingroup identification and 
perceived ingroup variability added as covariates).  
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Table 3. Estimated marginal means and standard errors of the direct group humiliation 
across the four experimental conditions, Experiment 1  
 Level of ingroup member humiliation 
  Low High 
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 Means Std. Error Means Std. Error 
Low 3.08 0.24 4.00 0.26 
High 3.39 0.27 3.77 0.24 
 
The fact that there was no significant interaction between personal humiliation and 
ingroup member humiliation suggests that the effect of the ingroup member humiliation 
manipulation on the feeling of direct group humiliation was the same for participants in the 
low personal humiliation condition and participants in the high personal humiliation 
condition.2 
Group-based humiliation 
A two-way between-groups analysis of variance (two-way ANOVA) was performed 
on group-based humiliation using personal humiliation and ingroup member humiliation as 
the independent variables and ingroup identification, perceived ingroup variability and 
susceptibility to feelings of humiliation as covariates. A similar pattern was found as reported 
for direct group humiliation. Ingroup member humiliation had a significant main effect on 
group-based humiliation F(1, 68) = 24.06, p < .01, ƞp2 = .26. This indicates that exposure to 
                                                          
2 An additional analysis of variance was performed without including the three covariates into the model. The 
pattern is seen to be the same. Ingroup member humiliation still had a significant main effect on direct group 
humiliation, F(1,78) = 5.13, p = .03, ƞp2 = .062. Personal humiliation did not have a significant main effect, F(1, 
78) = 0.28, p = .602, ƞp2 = .004 and there was no significant interaction effect either, F(1, 78) = 0.28, p = .60, ƞp2 
= .004. 
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ingroup member humiliation significantly affected the degree to which participants 
experienced group-based humiliation. Personal humiliation did not have a significant main 
effect, F(1, 68) = 0.19, p = .668, ƞp2  = .00) and the two-way interaction between personal 
humiliation and ingroup member humiliation did not have an effect either, F(1, 68) = 0.17, p 
= .745, ƞp2 = .00). Table 4 shows the marginal means of group-based humiliation across the 
four conditions (susceptibility to humiliation, ingroup identification and perceived ingroup 
variability added as covariates). The fact that there was no significant interaction between 
personal humiliation and ingroup member humiliation again suggests that the effect of the 
ingroup member humiliation manipulation on the experience of group-based humiliation was 
the same for participants who received the manipulation for personal humiliation and those 
that did not.3  
  
                                                          
3 When conducting additional analyses without controlling for the covariates, the same pattern occurred. 
Ingroup member humiliation still had a significant main effect on the experience of group-based humiliation 
F(1,78) = 23.31, p = .00, ƞp2 = .23. Personal humiliation did not have a significant main effect, F(1, 78) = 0.02, 
p = .901, ƞp2 = .00) and there was no significant interaction, F(1, 78) = 0.96, p = .331, ƞp2 = .01).  
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Table 4. Estimated marginal means and standard errors of group-based humiliation 
across the four experimental conditions, Experiment 1 
 Level of ingroup member humiliation 
  Low High 
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 Means Std. Error Means Std. Error 
Low 2.83 0.24 4.00 0.27 
High 2.90 0.27 4.20 0.24 
 
Overall, these results indicated that participants who received ingroup member 
humiliation manipulations (i.e. high ingroup member humiliation condition), scored higher 
on the group-level humiliation measures than participants who received no ingroup member 
humiliation manipulations (i.e. low ingroup member humiliation condition) regardless of 
whether they were in the low or high personal humiliation condition. The findings that 
personal humiliation manipulations did not have a main effect nor did it have an interaction 
effect with ingroup member humiliation manipulations on the dependent variables indicate 
that personal and ingroup member humiliation seem to be distinct from each other as 
proposed by the intergroup emotion theory (Smith et al., 2007). The latter is also 
demonstrated by the estimated marginal mean patterns in that participants in the low ingroup 
member humiliation conditions scored similarly lower on the dependent variables direct 
group humiliation (Table 3) and group-based humiliation (Table 4) irrespective whether their 
personal humiliation was low or high.  
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Discussion 
The first experiment aimed to investigate the possibility that an individual is able to 
experience humiliation on behalf of another member of his/her ingroup. Specifically, it was 
hypothesised that personal humiliation is distinct from group-level humiliation. The results 
showed that feelings of humiliation were evoked in participants in the high ingroup member 
humiliation conditions as ingroup member humiliation had a significant main effect on the 
experience of direct group humiliation, as well as the experience of group-based humiliation. 
Moreover, the estimated marginal means showed that participants in the low ingroup member 
humiliation conditions felt less direct group humiliation and group-based humiliation than 
participants in the high ingroup member humiliation condition. There were no significant 
main effects of personal humiliation on either of the two dependent variables. This can be 
expected given the fact that the dependent variables only assessed humiliation experienced on 
a group-level. However, there was no interaction effect either. The significant main effect of 
ingroup member humiliation and the non-significant main effect of personal humiliation, as 
well as the nonsignificant interaction effect, indicated that group-level humiliation is distinct 
from personal-level humiliation as proposed by the intergroup emotion theory (Smith et al., 
2007).  
Given that the findings of Experiment 1 needed to be replicated in order to be 
considered valid, a second experiment was performed to test again the hypothesis that group-
based humiliation is distinct from personal humiliation (Hypothesis 1). Experiment 2 also 
addressed corresponding emotions and behavioural consequences and therefore tested the 
hypotheses that the relationship between group-based humiliation and revenge is mediated 
via anger but not shame (Hypothesis 3) whereas the relationship between group-based 
humiliation and withdrawal is mediated via shame but not anger (Hypothesis 4).  
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Experiment 2 further aided in addressing issues that arose from Experiment 1. For 
instance, the result of Experiment 1 showed that neither ingroup identification nor perceived 
ingroup variability was statistically related to the dependent variables or covariates. The 
former is not in line with the intergroup emotion theory which states that group-based 
emotions depend on the degree of ingroup identification. A possible reason that group-based 
humiliation was independent from ingroup identification in Experiment 1 could be that 
participants construed the humiliated ingroup member (Thandeka and her position as a sports 
journalist) as non-prototypical for the group of females. Consequently, in Experiment 2 a 
cover story was applied using a more stereotypical context between females and males which 
was assumed to be easier for participants to relate. Secondly, no name of the humiliated 
ingroup member was used which allowed to include all racial groups as participants; and 
finally, perceived prototypicality of the humiliated ingroup member was controlled as 
previous research has shown that the more prototypical the humiliated ingroup member is 
perceived to be the stronger the behavioural responses are to the experience of group-based 
humiliation (Jonas et al., 2014). 
Another interesting pattern was seen in the results of Experiment 1. Participants 
scored relatively high on the dependent variables irrespective whether they were exposed to 
low and high personal humiliation manipulations. When looking at the means for low and 
high personal humiliation on direct group humiliation, as well as the means for low and high 
personal humiliation on group-based humiliation, it can be seen that the means are very 
similar in the two conditions. These results might be due to the social category (gender) used 
in this experiment, namely males (outgroup) and females (ingroup). The ingroup of females 
used is an established group with a particular history and a particular presence with the 
outgroup of males which might have influenced the personal humiliation manipulations. 
Female participants might have thought about inequality, lowered status and disrespect when 
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being asked about a recent interaction with a male because gender inequality is still a lived 
reality within South Africa (Oliphant, 2015). Whether or not the same pattern was found 
using the same intergroup contact was studied in Experiment 2. 
 
Experiment 2 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to extent on the findings of Experiment 1 by testing 
again that group-based humiliation is distinct from personal-level humiliation (Hypothesis 1). 
Moreover, the second experiment aimed to address the emotional and behavioural responses 
to group-based humiliation.  Therefore, corresponding emotional and behavioural intentions 
to group-based humiliation were measured. Specifically, the second experiment hypothesised 
that the relationship between group-based humiliation and revenge is mediated via anger but 
not shame (Hypothesis 3) whereas the relationship between group-based humiliation and 
withdrawal is mediated via shame but not anger (Hypothesis 4). Also, in the present 
experiment perceived prototypicality of the humiliated ingroup member was measured and 
controlled for. As in the first experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
experimental conditions in a 2 (Personal humiliation: High vs. Low) x 2 (Ingroup member 
humiliation: High vs. Low) factorial between-subjects design. 
Sample 
For the second experiment the minimum required sample size was estimated 
beforehand. Using G*Power 3 for F statistics (ANOVA: fixed effects, special, main and 
interaction effects) a minimum sample size of N = 140 was calculated assuming an effect size 
of f = .04, alpha level of .05, and a minimum desired statistical power of .95, seven 
numerators df and four groups (G*Power 3, see Faul et al., 2007). Given the fact that the 
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experiment was conducted via the internet, the sample size was checked weekly and data 
collection was stopped when the threshold was passed (N = 146).  
A total of 146 female students registered at the University of South Africa in the 
College of Economic and Management Studies participated in Experiment 2. The age of 
participants ranged from 20 to 60 years (Mage = 33.44, missing: 18). One hundred and sixteen 
participants indicated that they are South African and nine participants indicated non-South 
African nationalities. None of the participants identified the true aim of the experiment and 
were therefore all included in the following analyses. The 146 participants were distributed to 
the four experimental conditions as outlined in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Number of participants in the four experimental conditions, Experiment 2 
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                                                   Level of ingroup member humiliation 
 Low High 
Low n = 33 n = 36 
High n = 38 n = 39 
 
Experimental Manipulations 
Personal humiliation 
Low and high personal humiliation was manipulated using the same procedure and 
instructions as in Experiment 1. 
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Ingroup member humiliation 
The manipulation of ingroup member humiliation followed the same procedure as in 
Experiment 1. However, a different story was used. As in Experiment 1 the scenario was 
fabricated to represent the humiliation of an ingroup member. Again, the scenario described 
disrespect, lowered status and the violation of a social norm, but a more stereotypical context 
between females and males was used (compared to the scenario in Experiment 1) which was 
assumed to be easier for participants to relate to. The scenario of Experiment 2 did not 
include a name of the ingroup member in order to avoid the inter-racial context becoming 
salient instead of the gender context. The instruction read as follow: “Now, please read the 
following story that appeared on a lady’s Facebook page a few weeks ago”.  
 
Experience at work 
Hi all. I would like to share with you a recent experience at the company where I have been 
working for a few weeks now. One of my male colleagues informed me the other day that if I 
need to drive somewhere to do consultations off premises, the company requires for 
insurance reasons that we use one of the company’s cars. Last Monday I went down to the 
garage where the company’s cars are kept and I asked one of the technicians if I could use 
one of the cars for the following day, as I was scheduled for a consultation off premise. He 
requested that I show him the company’s driving certificate. When I asked him what that is, 
he said that I need to do a driver’s test organised by the company and they will issue me with 
a certificate. He told me that he cannot allow me to take a company car without this 
certificate. Later that day I saw my male colleague in the cafeteria where he was sitting at a 
table with other male colleagues. I went up to him and told him about this driving certificate 
and he replied that he has never been asked for this certificate. One of the other male 
colleagues replied that the company requires only female employees to do this test before 
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they are allowed to use the company’s cars!  All the male colleagues at the table started 
laughing! I felt so humiliated! 
 
In the low ingroup member humiliation conditions, participants were asked to read the 
following scenario where an ingroup member had a neutral interaction with males.   
 
Experience at work 
Hi all. I would like to share with you a recent experience at the company where I have been 
working for a few weeks now. One of my male colleagues informed me the other day that if I 
need to drive somewhere to do consultations off premises, the company requires for 
insurance reasons that we use one of the company’s cars. Last Monday I went down to the 
garage where the company’s cars are kept and I asked one of the technicians if I could use 
one of the cars for the following day, as I was scheduled for a consultation off premise. He 
replied of course I can. He took my details and the booking was confirmed. The next morning 
the car key was waiting for me at reception. It was so nice to be able to use the company's 
cars for the day!” 
 
Measurements 
As in Experiment 1 all items of the respective scales were randomly presented to the 
participants. The measurements were presented to the participants in the order as described in 
the subsequent sections. 
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Dependent variables 
The degree to which humiliation was experienced by participants was assessed using 
the same two scales (with the same items) and answer formats as described in Experiment 1. 
The five items used for measuring direct group humiliation (α =.90) and group-based 
humiliation (α = .96) formed reliable scales.  
Participants’ emotional responses were measured by providing them with a list of 
feelings and they had to indicate to what extent each of the emotions listed matched their 
feelings at that moment using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 
(Extremely). Three items measured anger (“angry”, “annoyed”, “outraged”) (Veldhuis et al., 
2014) forming a reliable scale (α = .86). Three items measured shame (“ashamed”, “small”, 
“shame”) (Roseman et al., 1994; van Driel, 2011) and these three items also formed a reliable 
scale (α =.83). Three positive emotions were added but not used in the further analysis (“joy”, 
“happy”, “proud”). 
Participants’ behavioural intentions were measured as withdrawal and revenge. 
Although the measurement for revenge was labelled ‘revenge’, the items used in this measure 
assessed a subtler form of revenge namely the intention to engage in retributive behaviour. It 
was considered more ethical to ask participants about the likelihood that they would engage 
in a subtler rather than blatant form of revenge as the context used in the ingroup member 
humiliation manipulation did not represent a ‘severe’ humiliation situation. Revenge as 
behavioural intentions was assessed by two items which were in line with the concepts of the 
Organizational Revenge Scale (Sommers & Vodanovich, 2002) and adapted to the present 
research context: “To file a complaint” and “To sign a petition” (r = .605, p < .01). The 
intention to engage in withdrawal was assessed by two items (van Driel, 2011) and adapted 
for the present experiment: “To avoid interactions” and “To hide from interactions” (r = .547, 
p < .01).  
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Participants were asked to indicate what the likelihood would be that they would 
engage in those behaviours at that moment using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(Extremely unlikely) to 5 (Extremely likely). 
 
Manipulation check measures 
The same three items that were used in Experiment 1 to check if the manipulation for 
personal humiliation was successful were used (α = .92). The manipulation of ingroup 
member humiliation was assessed by the following three items: “In the Facebook story, the 
woman was treated unfairly”; “In the Facebook story, the woman was humiliated”; “In the 
Facebook story, the woman was disrespected” (α = .97). For all the items used for the 
manipulation checks, the participants had to indicate their level of agreement on a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Extremely).  
 
Covariate measures 
If not stated differently, all covariates were assessed using a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and the items of the respective scales 
were randomly presented to the participants.  
Perceived prototypicality of the humiliated ingroup member was measured using one 
pictorial item (Schubert & Otten, 2002). Participants were provided with an image showing 
circles that were increasingly overlapping. The participants were further informed that the 
image indicates the representation of the woman in the Facebook story (smaller circles) 
related to the group of women (bigger circles). The instruction read:  If you look at the 
representation image, the further away from each other the circles are the less the woman in 
the Facebook story represents women; whereas the closer the circles are to each other, the 
more she represents women. The first answer option below indicates that the woman in the 
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Facebook story is “not at all representative for women”, the answer option at the bottom 
indicates that the woman in the Facebook story is “completely representative for women”. 
Please tell us which representation is the most appropriate according to you”. The 
participants could choose one of seven possible options ranging from (1) “not at all 
representative for women” to (7) “completely representative for women”. 
Ingroup identification (α = .83), perceived ingroup variability and susceptibility to 
feelings of humiliation (α = .89) as covariates were measured using the same items as used in 
the Experiment 1. Similar to Experiment 1 the item “Not all women should be treated the 
same way” to assess perceived ingroup variability did not correlate with the other two items 
(Corrected Item Total correlation = .027). It was decided to use only the items (“Women are 
not all alike”; “Women differ from each other”) for the perceived ingroup variability measure 
(r = .365, p < .01).  
 
Results 
Preliminary analysis 
Manipulation checks 
Two-way analyses of variance were performed on the manipulation check measures 
with the two experimental conditions entered as independent variables. 
 Results of the two-way ANOVA on the personal humiliation manipulation check 
showed that personal humiliation had a significant main effect on the personal humiliation 
manipulation check, F(1, 139) = 10.77, p <  ƞp2 = .07. The means indicated that participants 
in the high personal humiliation conditions (M = 2.83, SD = 1.25, n = 77) scored significantly 
higher on the personal humiliation manipulation check than participants in the lower personal 
humiliation conditions (M = 2.14, SD = 1.30, n = 66). Ingroup member humiliation did not 
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have an effect, F(1, 139) = 2.85, p = .094, ƞp2 = .02, and there was not a significant 
interaction between the two experimental conditions, F(1, 139) = 0.28, p = .597, ƞp2 = .002.  
Results of the two-way ANOVA performed on the ingroup member humiliation check 
showed that ingroup member humiliation had a significant effect on the ingroup member 
humiliation manipulation check, F(1, 139) = 313.53, p < .001, ƞp2 = .70, while personal 
humiliation did not have an effect, F(1, 139) = 0.435, p = .511,  ƞp2 = .003. Participants in the 
high ingroup member humiliation conditions (M = 4.35, SD = 0.61, n = 74) scored higher on 
the manipulation check than participants in the low ingroup member humiliation conditions 
(M = 1.67, SD = 1.12, n = 69). There was no significant interaction between ingroup member 
humiliation and personal humiliation on the dependent variable, F(1, 139) =0.081, p = .776, 
ƞp2 = .001.  
These results of the manipulation checks served as indication of the success of the 
manipulations in this experiment. 
 
Descriptive statistics  
Table 6 summarises the means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-
correlations of all assessed variables. As in Experiment 1, the descriptive statistics (see Table 
6) revealed that there was a significant correlation between the two dependent variables, 
direct group humiliation and group-based humiliation. Also, as in Experiment 1, 
susceptibility to feelings of humiliation correlated significantly to direct group humiliation, as 
well as to group-based humiliation. In the current experiment, ingroup identification 
correlated significantly with both direct group humiliation as well as group-based 
humiliation. One of the criteria of the intergroup emotion theory proposes that group-based 
emotions relate to the level of identification with the ingroup ( Smith et al., 2007). As in 
Experiment 1, how diverse participants perceived ingroup members to be did not relate to 
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direct group humiliation or group-based humiliation. Previous research found that perceived 
ingroup variability relates to ingroup identification (Doosje, Ellemers, Spears, 1995), but in 
the current experiment it did not correlate significantly with ingroup identification either. 
Anger, as well as shame correlated significantly with direct group humiliation and group-
based humiliation which is in line with the findings of Leidner et al. (2012). Withdrawal only 
correlated moderately significant with direct group humiliation but not with group-based 
humiliation, while the revenge response correlated significantly with both. Humiliation 
experienced on a group-level seems to be linked to aggression as stated by a number of 
researchers (Hartling et al., 2013; Elison & Harter, 2007). Empirical evidence has shown that 
the more anger increases, so does the tendency to approach, which includes vengeful 
behaviour (van Driel, 2011). In the current experiment there is a significant correlation 
between anger and revenge. Perceived prototypicality did not have a significant relationship 
with any of the emotional or behavioural responses. It did correlate significantly though with 
group-based humiliation but not with direct group humiliation.
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Table 6. The means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-correlations of the assessed variables, Experiment 2 
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Mean 3.18 3.01 2.21 1.80 2.81 3.06 2.51 3.06 4.53 3.90 3.87 2.70 
SD 1.13 1.42 1.12 1.00 2.60 1.17 1.31 1.61 2.15 0.60 0.83 0.94 
n 150 150 148 148 146 146 143 143 137 138 138 138 
1  .621** .520** .452** .217** .392** .514** .439** .114 .218* .016 .513** 
2   .536** .374** .081 .479** .320** .840** .193* .181* .055 .247** 
3    .610** .119 .494** .402** .513** .116 .282** -.056 .225** 
4     .250** .241** .390** .317** -.048 .289** -.124 .384** 
5      .249** .207* .033 -.125 -.058 -.001 .296** 
6       .214* .458** .129 .247** .045 .089 
7        .247** .066 .172* -.017 .421** 
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Note: ** correlation significant at p < .01 level,  *correlation significant at p < .05 level
8         .125 .161 -.084 .089 
9          .110 -.004 .102 
10           -.311 .131 
11            -.011 
12             
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Hypotheses Testing 
Group-based versus personal humiliation  
The first hypothesis proposed that group-based humiliation is distinct from personal-level 
humiliation. As this second experiment is first of all a replication of Experiment 1, the same 
independent variables and covariates were entered into the two-way between-groups analysis of 
variance (two-way ANOVA). Again, it was predicted that participants would feel more group-
based humiliation in the high when compared to the low ingroup member humiliation conditions. 
The two-way between-groups analysis of variance (two-way ANOVA) was performed firstly, on 
the direct group humiliation and secondly, on group-based humiliation entering the personal 
humiliation and ingroup member humiliation as independent variables and ingroup 
identification, perceived ingroup variability and susceptibility to feelings of humiliation as 
covariates into the model.  
The experimental condition of ingroup member humiliation had a significant main effect 
on direct group humiliation, F(1, 131) = 16.59, p < .01, ƞp2 = .11. As the means suggest, 
participants in the low ingroup member humiliation condition (M = 2.85, σx̅ = 0.11) felt less 
direct group humiliation than participants in the high ingroup member humiliation condition (M 
= 3.50, σx̅ = 0.10). Susceptibility to feelings of humiliation, F(1, 131) = 54.46, p = .000, ƞp2  = 
.30 and ingroup identification, F(1, 131) = 5.21, p = .024, ƞp2 = .04, had main effects on the 
dependent variable. Similar to Experiment 1, personal humiliation did not exert a significant 
main effect, F(1, 131) = 2.70, p = .103, ƞp2 = .02, and the interaction between personal 
humiliation and ingroup member humiliation did not reach statistical significance either on the 
dependent variable, F(1, 131) = 2.70, p = .104, ƞp2 = .02. This indicates that exposure to ingroup 
member humiliation significantly affected the degree to which participants experienced direct 
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group humiliation regardless of the level of personal humiliation. Table 7 shows the estimated 
marginal means of direct group humiliation across the four experimental conditions 
(susceptibility to humiliation, ingroup identification and perceived ingroup variability added as 
covariates). 
 
Table 7. Estimated marginal means and standard errors of direct group humiliation across 
the four experimental conditions, Experiment 2 
 Level of ingroup member humiliation 
  Low High 
L
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f 
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n
 
 Means Std. Error Means Std. Error 
Low 2.85 0.17 3.23 0.15 
High 2.85 0.15 3.75 0.14 
 
In a second analysis, a two-way between-groups analysis of variance (two-way ANOVA) 
was performed on group-based humiliation using the same two independent variables and the 
same three covariates. Again, the experimental condition of ingroup member humiliation, F(1, 
131) = 144.23, p = .000, ƞp2 = .52, had significant main effects on the experience of group-based 
humiliation. As the means suggest, participants in the low ingroup member humiliation condition 
(M = 1.97, σx̅ = 0.12) felt less group-based humiliation than participants in the high ingroup 
member humiliation condition (M = 4.00,  σx̅ = 0.11). Susceptibility to feelings of humiliation, 
F(1, 131) = 19.83, p < .01, ƞp2 = .13 and ingroup identification, F(1, 131) = 4.56, p = .035, ƞp2 = 
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.03, had significant main effects on the dependent variable. Personal humiliation did not exert a 
significant main effect, F(1, 131) = 2.90, p = .091, ƞp2  = .022) and the interaction between 
personal humiliation and ingroup member humiliation did not reach statistical significance either 
on group-based humiliation, F(1, 131) = 1.53, p = .217, ƞp2 = .01). Again, ingroup member 
humiliation significantly affected the degree to which participants experienced group-based 
humiliation irrespective of personal humiliation. Table 8 indicates the estimated marginal means 
of group-based humiliation across each experimental condition (susceptibility to humiliation, 
ingroup identification and perceived ingroup variability added as covariates).  
 
Table 8. Estimated marginal means and standard errors of group-based humiliation across 
the four experimental conditions, Experiment 2 
 Level of ingroup member humiliation 
  Low High 
L
ev
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f 
p
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n
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o
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 Means Std. Error Means Std. Error 
Low 1.93 0.17 3.70 0.16 
High 2.00 0.16 4.17 0.15 
 
In the following analysis perceived prototypicality of the humiliated ingroup member was 
included. Firstly, a two-way between-group analysis of variance (two-way ANOVA) was 
performed on direct group humiliation using personal humiliation and ingroup member 
humiliation as the independent variables. Ingroup identification, perceived ingroup variability, 
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susceptibility to feelings of humiliation and perceived prototypicality were entered as covariates 
in the model. The results showed that the experimental condition of ingroup member 
humiliation, F(1, 128) = 18.92, p = .000, ƞp2 = .13, had significant main effects on direct group 
humiliation. Susceptibility to feelings of humiliation, F(1, 128) = 51.47, p = .000, ƞp2  = .28, and 
ingroup identification, F(1, 128) = 11.11, p = .001, ƞp2 = .08, were significant covariates, but 
prototypicality of the ingroup member was not a significant covariate, F(1, 128) = 0.01, p = .916, 
ƞp2 = .00. When controlling for perceived prototypicality, personal humiliation exerted a 
significant main effect on direct humiliation, F(1, 128) = 3.93, p = .05, ƞp2 = .03. The interaction 
between personal humiliation and ingroup member humiliation did not reach statistical 
significance, F(1, 128) = 2.35, p = .127, ƞp2 = .02.4 Table 9 shows the estimated marginal means 
of direct group humiliation across each experimental condition (prototypicality of ingroup 
member, susceptibility to humiliation, ingroup identification and perceived ingroup variability 
added as covariates).  
  
                                                          
4 An additional analysis of variance was performed without including any of the covariates into the model. Ingroup 
member humiliation still had a significant main effect on direct group humiliation, F(1,146) = 14.904, p < .001, ƞp2 
= .09. Personal humiliation did not have a significant main effect, F(1, 146) = 1.26, p = .263, ƞp2 = .009 and there 
was no significant interaction effect either, F(1, 146) = 1.70, p = .195, ƞp2 = .01 
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Table 9. Marginal means and standard errors of direct group humiliation across the four     
conditions with perceived prototypicality, susceptibility to humiliation, ingroup 
identification and perceived ingroup variability as covariates, Experiment 2  
 Level of ingroup member humiliation 
  Low High 
L
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 Means Std. Error Means Std. Error 
Low 2.79 0.17 3.21 0.15 
High 2.86 0.15 3.76 0.15 
   
In the next analysis, a two-way between-groups analysis of variance (two-way ANOVA) 
was performed on group-based humiliation using the same two independent variables and the 
same four covariates. Again, ingroup member humiliation, F(1, 128) = 151.68, p = .000, ƞp2 = 
.54, susceptibility to feelings of humiliation, F(1, 128) = 17.52, p = .000, ƞp2  = .12, and ingroup 
identification, F(1, 128) = 7.16, p = .008, ƞp2 = .05, had significant main effects on group-based 
humiliation. Once more, prototypicality of the ingroup member was not a significant covariate, 
F(1, 128) = 2.30, p = .132, ƞp2 = .19. When controlling for perceived prototypicality, personal 
humiliation exerted a marginal significant effect on the experience of group-based humiliation, 
F(1, 128) = 3.86 p = .052, ƞp2 = .03. The interaction between personal humiliation and ingroup 
member humiliation was not statistically significant, F(1, 128) = .90, p = .346, ƞp2 = .00.5 Table 
                                                          
5 An additional analysis of variance was performed without including the covariates into the model. Ingroup member 
humiliation still had a significant main effect on group-based humiliation, F(1,146) = 135.88, p < .001,     ƞp2 = .482. 
Personal humiliation did not have a significant main effect, F(1, 146) = 1.64, p = .203, ƞp2 = .01 and there was no 
significant interaction effect either, F(1, 146) = 1.26, p = .264, ƞp2 = .009. 
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10 indicates the estimated marginal means of group-based humiliation across the four 
experimental conditions (prototypicality of ingroup member, susceptibility to humiliation, 
ingroup identification and perceived ingroup variability added as covariates). 
 
Table 10. Marginal means and standard errors of group-based humiliation across the four 
conditions with perceived prototypicality, susceptibility to humiliation, ingroup 
identification and perceived ingroup variability as covariates, Experiment 2  
 Level of ingroup member humiliation 
  Low High 
L
ev
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 Means Std. Error Means Std. Error 
Low 1.90 0.17 3.70 0.16 
High 2.03 0.16 4.18 0.15 
 
Overall, these results indicated that participants in this experiment who received ingroup 
member humiliation manipulations (i.e. high ingroup member humiliation condition), scored 
higher on the humiliation measures than participants that received no ingroup member 
humiliation manipulations (i.e. low ingroup member humiliation condition). How prototypical 
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participants perceived the humiliated ingroup member to be did not have a direct effect on their 
experience of humiliation6 
Responses to humiliation 
The second aim of Experiment 2 was to address the emotional and behavioural responses 
to group-based humiliation. It was hypothesised that the relationship between group-based 
humiliation and revengeful behavior is mediated via anger but not shame (Hypothesis 3) whereas 
the relationship between group-based humiliation and withdrawal is mediated via shame but not 
anger (Hypothesis 4). To test these hypotheses two mediation models were conducted with 
group-based humiliation (measured variable) as independent variable, shame and anger as 
parallel mediators and revenge or withdrawal behaviour as dependent variables (see Figure 1 and 
2).   
  
                                                          
6 To study whether perceived prototypicality of the ingroup member moderates the relationship between ingroup 
member humiliation and the experience of group-based humiliation, a moderation model was conducted using 
Process (Hayes, 2013) with ingroup member humiliation as independent variable, the experience of group-based 
humiliation as dependent variable and perceived prototypicality as moderator. Ingroup identification was controlled 
for. Results showed that there was no significant interaction between ingroup member humiliation and perceived 
prototypicality, t(4, 131) = 1.137, σx̅ = 0.081, p = .258. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual diagram of the parallel multiple mediator model for revenge 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2. Conceptual diagram of the parallel multiple mediator model for withdrawal 
 
M2 Shame 
M1 Anger 
Y Revenge X Group-based 
humiliation 
M1 Anger 
M2 Shame 
Y Withdrawal X Group-based 
humiliation 
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Revenge model 
To test the revenge model, a mediation model (including two parallel mediators) was 
conducted using Process (Hayes, 2013) and using the bootstrapping method with 10000 
iterations. Group-based humiliation (measured variable) was entered as independent variable, 
shame and anger were entered as parallel mediator variables and revenge behaviour was entered 
as dependent variable. The overall model was significant and explained 31.84% of variance in 
the dependent variable “revenge”. The detailed results of the mediation model are reported in 
Table 11. The results of the specific indirect effects using bootstrap confidence intervals indicate 
that anger but not shame mediated the relationship between group-based humiliation and 
revenge. This interpretation is supported by the results of the rather conservative normal theory 
tests which revealed that the mediation via anger was statistically significant, Z = 3.661, p < .01, 
but not the mediation via shame, Z = -1.346, p = .178. The results further showed that group-
based humiliation had a direct effect on revenge when controlling for the emotional responses. 
The latter suggests that anger partially mediates the relationship. Or in other words, group-based 
humiliation influences revenge directly and indirectly via anger.7 
  
                                                          
7  A mediation-moderation model was tested using Process (Hayes, 2013) where group-based humiliation 
(measured variable) was added as independent variable, anger as mediator, prototypicality as moderator and 
revenge as dependent variable. Results showed that there was no significant interaction between group-based 
humiliation and prototypicality, t(4, 132) = 0.199, σx ̅= 0.027, p = .842. 
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Table 11. Total, direct and indirect effect of group-based humiliation on revenge, Experiment 2 
 B SE p 
Group-based 
humiliation on anger 
.424 0.056 .000 
Group-based 
humiliation on shame 
.271 0.054 .000 
Direct effects of 
anger on revenge 
.420 .099 .000 
Direct effects of 
shame on revenge 
-.146 0.102 .156 
Total effect of group-
based humiliation on 
revenge 
.393 0.060 .000 
Direct effect of 
group-based 
humiliation on 
revenge 
 
 
.255 0.068 .000 
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Model Summary for 
DV Model 
R2 = .3184, F (3,142) = 22.11, p < .01 
 B Boot SE [Boot LLCI, Boot 
ULCI] 
Indirect Effect of 
anger (using 95% 
bias corrected 
confidence interval  
.178 0.047 [.0954, .2821] 
Indirect Effect of 
shame using 95% 
bias corrected 
confidence interval 
-.039 0.028 [-.1023, .0076] 
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Withdrawal model 
To test the withdrawal model, a mediation model (including two parallel mediators) was 
conducted using Process (Hayes, 2013) and using the bootstrapping method with 10000 
iterations. Again group-based humiliation was entered as independent variable, shame and anger 
were entered as parallel mediator variables and withdrawal was entered as dependent variable. 
The overall model was significant but explained only 6.6% variance of withdrawal. The detailed 
results of the meditation model are summarized in Table 12. The results of the indirect effects 
using bootstrap confidence interval show that in this model shame but not anger mediated the 
relationship between group-based humiliation and withdrawal. Again, this result is supported by 
the more conservative normal theory tests in that the mediation via shame was statistically 
significant, Z = 2.377, p = .017, but not the mediation via anger, Z = -0.4860, p = .627. Different 
to the “revenge model” the results of the “withdrawal model” showed that group-based 
humiliation did not have a direct effect on withdrawal when controlling for the emotional 
responses. The latter suggests that shame fully mediated the relationship between group-based 
humiliation and withdrawal.8 
 
 
 
  
  
                                                          
8 A mediation-moderation model was tested using Process (Hayes, 2013) where group-based humiliation (measured 
variable) was added as independent variable, shame as mediator, prototypicality as moderator and withdrawal as 
dependent variable. Again, in this model there was not a significant interaction between group-based humiliation 
and prototypicality, t(4, 132)= -1.55, σx̅ = 0.072, p = .123. 
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Table 12. Total, direct and indirect effect of group-based humiliation on withdrawal, Experiment 
2  
 B SE p 
Group-based 
humiliation on anger 
.424 0.056 .000 
Group-based 
humiliation on shame 
.271 0.054 .000 
Direct effects of 
anger on withdrawal 
-.127 0.258 .624 
Direct effects of 
shame on withdrawal 
.729 0.264 .006 
Total effect of group-
based humiliation on 
withdrawal 
.146 0.151 .333 
Direct effect of 
group-based 
humiliation on 
withdrawal 
 
.002 0.175 .989 
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Model Summary for 
DV Model 
R2 = .065, F (3,142) = 3.27, p = .023 
 B Boot SE [Boot LLCI, Boot 
ULCI] 
Indirect Effect of 
anger (using 95% 
bias corrected 
confidence interval  
-.054 0.110 [-.3117, .1244] 
Indirect Effect of 
shame using 95% 
bias corrected 
confidence interval 
.198 0.099 [.0428, .4385] 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 first aimed to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 by showing that an 
individual is able to experience humiliation on behalf of another member of his/her ingroup. 
Again, it was hypothesised that group-based humiliation is distinct from personal humiliation. 
Similar to the first experiment, the results showed that feelings of direct group humiliation and 
group-based humiliation were evoked for participants in the high ingroup member humiliation 
condition as ingroup member humiliation exerted a significant main effect on both dependent 
variables. The means for low ingroup member humiliation and high ingroup member humiliation 
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showed that participants in the low ingroup member humiliation conditions felt less direct group 
humiliation and group-based humiliation than participants in the high ingroup member 
humiliation condition. As in Experiment 1, personal humiliation did not have a significant main 
effect on either of the dependent variables and no significant interactions were found. These 
results are an indication that ingroup member humiliation is independent from personal 
humiliation as proposed by the intergroup emotion theory (Smith et al., 2007), therefore 
confirming the first hypothesis of Experiment 2.  
There was another similarity seen in the results of Experiment 2 compared to the first 
experiment. In Experiment 1 participants in the low and high personal humiliation conditions 
scored relatively similar on the two dependent variables. A similar pattern was seen in 
Experiment 2. By studying the estimated marginal means (see Table 7, 8, 9 and 10) it can be 
seen that participants who were in the low and high personal humiliation condition respectively, 
scored very similar on the dependent variables. Again, in the conditions where no personal 
humiliation was manipulated, it might actually be that in fact humiliation was triggered as 
participants in the low personal humiliation condition perceived themselves humiliated when 
asked about an interaction with a male or males. As in Experiment 1, a conclusion that one can 
make from this is that the female participants in Experiment 2 also thought about lowered status, 
inequality or disrespect when asked about an interaction with a male.  
Different to the results in Experiment 1, ingroup identification correlated significantly 
with both dependent variables and results of the two-way ANOVA showed that it had a main 
effect on direct, as well as group-based humiliation. This indicates that the level of ingroup 
identification played a role in the experience of humiliation in the present experiment.  
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However, given the findings of Experiment 1 and 2, the role of ingroup identification in 
the experience of group-level humiliation seems to be rather ambiguous. In order to understand 
the interplay between ingroup identification and group-based humiliation and thus to test 
Hypothesis 2, namely that high identified participants experience more group-based humiliation 
than low identifiers, it was decided to include ingroup identification as independent variable in 
Experiment 3. The level of ingroup identification was manipulated on two levels, namely 
moderate and high ingroup identification. 
Experiment 2 also aimed to look at the emotional and behavioural responses to 
humiliation. Two mediation models were conducted using Process (Hayes, 2013). In the first 
model it was tested whether anger or shame mediates the relationship between the experience of 
group-based humiliation and the intention to engage in revenge. The results confirmed 
Hypothesis 3 in that group-based humiliation directly predicted revenge, and that this 
relationship was partially mediated by anger. This means that participants who experienced 
humiliation on behalf of an ingroup member either directly responded with revenge or became 
angrier which resulted in the response of revenge. Shame was not a significant mediator of this 
relationship. In the second model it was tested whether anger or shame mediated the relationship 
between group-based humiliation and the intention to withdraw. Results confirmed Hypothesis 4 
in that this relationship was fully mediated by shame, meaning that participants first had to feel 
shame before they would engage in withdrawal behaviour. Anger was not a significant mediator.  
These results suggest that when participants experienced group-based humiliation they 
either attributed the event externally (i.e., feeling that men treat women unjust and unfairly) or 
internally (i.e. feeling that women probably deserve to be treated that way). In the former case 
participants responded either directly with revenge or indirectly via anger. In the latter 
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participants responded with withdrawal via the feeling of shame. In Experiment 3 the same 
revenge and withdrawal mediation models were again tested in order to gain confidence in their 
validity. 
 
Experiment 3 
The aim of Experiment 3 was to focus on the relationship between ingroup identification 
and group-based humiliation. Specifically, this experiment aimed to test the hypothesis that 
highly identified participants experience more group-based humiliation than low identifiers 
(Hypothesis 2). Additional aims of this experiment were to address the responses of group-based 
humiliation, as was tested in Experiment 2. Therefore, Experiment 3 hypothesised that the 
relationship between group-based humiliation and revenge is mediated via anger but not shame 
(Hypothesis 3) and the relationship between group-based humiliation and withdrawal is mediated 
via shame but not anger (Hypothesis 4). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
experimental conditions in a 2 (Ingroup identification: high vs. moderate) x 2 (Ingroup member 
humiliation: high vs. moderate) factorial between-subjects design. 
Sample 
As in Experiment 2, the minimum required sample size was estimated before the 
experiment was conducted. Using G*Power 3 for F statistics (ANOVA: fixed effects, special, 
main and interaction effects) a minimum sample size of N = 136 was calculated assuming an 
effect size of f = .40, alpha level of .05, and a minimum desired statistical power of .95, six 
numerators df and four groups (G*Power 3, see Faul et al., 2007). Given the fact that the 
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experiment was conducted via the internet, the sample size was checked weekly and data 
collection was stopped when the threshold was passed (N = 275).  
A total of 275 female students registered at the University of South Africa in the College 
of Economic and Management Studies participated in Experiment 3. It is important to note that 
none of these participants participated in Experiment 2. The age of participants ranged from 19 
to 53 years (Mage = 32.12). Two hundred and forty-three participants indicated that they are 
South African and 30 participants indicated non-South African nationalities. None of the 
participants identified the true aim of the experiment and were therefore all included in the 
analyses. The 275 participants were distributed to the four experimental conditions as outlined in 
Table 13.  
 
Table 13. Number of participants in the four experimental conditions, Experiment 3 
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                                                   Level of ingroup member humiliation 
 Low High 
Moderate n = 69 n = 73 
High n = 68 n = 65 
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Experimental Manipulation 
Ingroup identification 
For the manipulation for moderate and high ingroup identification, participants were 
asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) to what 
extent they agreed with five general statements that referred to group membership: (1) mingling 
with other women is important to me”; (2) when I meet men I always talk about women in a 
positive light”, (3) “I could not care less about other women”; (4) I would do very well on a test 
about the history of women’s struggle for equality in South Africa”; (5) “I would vote for a 
female president just because she’s a woman”. Further instructions explained that these 
statements represented a psychological instrument by which a person’s emotional distance to the 
group of women can be assessed. Participants were further led to believe that that this measure 
has been normed and that the participant’s personal score, based on her answers to the previous 
statements, can be calculated and that she can be provided with feedback about her personal 
distance score. The participant was then told that she can find out what her personal emotional 
distance score is by going to the next page. All participants then received a score of 16.78 and 
they were informed that they share this score with the majority of women (nearly 58%). 
Participants in the moderate ingroup identification condition were told that their score indicates a 
moderate identification with women and participants in the high identification condition were 
informed that their score represents a high identification with women. The participants were also 
provided with a figure with the invented score showing smaller and bigger circles that are 
increasingly overlapping supposedly indicating the distance of their score from the group of 
women (see Figure 3 and 4). 
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Figure 3. Moderate ingroup identification 
condition 
Figure 4. High ingroup identification condition 
  
 
Ingroup member humiliation 
Low and high ingroup member humiliation was manipulated using the same procedure, 
instructions and material as in Experiment 2. 
Measurements 
As in Experiment 1 and 2, all items of the respective scales were randomly presented to 
the participants. Participants were presented with the following measurements in the same order 
as described below. 
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Dependent variables 
The degree to which humiliation on behalf of the humiliated ingroup member was 
experienced by participants was assessed using the group-based humiliation measure that was 
used in Experiment 1 and 2 (α = .95). Direct group humiliation was not measured in this 
experiment.  
Participants’ emotional and behavioural responses were measured using the same items 
and answering formats used in Experiment 2. The three items for anger and shame formed 
reliable scales, respectively (αanger = .89; αshame = .80). The two items measuring withdrawal 
behaviour correlated significantly (r = .709, p < .01) as well as the two items measuring revenge 
(r = .655, p < .01). 
 
Manipulation check measures 
The same three items and answer formats that were used in Experiment 2 to check if the 
manipulation for ingroup member humiliation was successful were used (α = .90). For the 
ingroup identification manipulation check three items were used: “I feel strong bonds with 
women”; “I feel close to women”; “I identify with women” (α = .96). For these three items the 
participants had to indicate their level of agreement on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not 
at all) to 6 (Extremely).  
 
Covariate measures 
As in Experiment 2, all covariates were assessed using a 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and the items of the respective scales were 
randomly presented to the participants.  
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Perceived prototypicality, perceived ingroup variability and susceptibility to feelings of 
humiliation (α = .89) were measured as in the previous experiments. As in Experiment 2, the 
item “Not all women should be treated the same way” measuring perceived ingroup variability 
did not correlate with the other two items (Corrected Item Total correlation = .173). The two 
remaining items (“Women are not all alike”; “Women differ from each other”) correlated 
significantly (r = .616, p < .01).  
 
Results 
Preliminary analysis 
Manipulation checks 
A two-way analyses of variance was performed on the ingroup identification 
manipulation check, entering the two experimental conditions as independent variables. The 
ingroup identification condition did not exert a main effect on the ingroup identification 
manipulation check, F(1, 271) = 1.60, p = .207, ƞp2 = .006. By studying the means it was seen 
that although participants in the high ingroup identification condition (M = 4.00, SD = 1.19, n = 
142) scored slightly higher on the ingroup identification manipulation check than participants in 
the moderate ingroup identification condition (M = 3.80, SD = 1.16, n = 134), the difference did 
not reach statistical significance, t (274) = -1.26, p = .207, d = 0.17. The ingroup member 
humiliation condition also did not have an effect, F(1, 271) = 1.10, p = .296, ƞp2 = .004 and the 
interaction between the experimental conditions reached significance, F(1, 271) = 4.64, p = .032, 
ƞp2 = .017. These results indicate that manipulating the level of ingroup identification was not 
successful according to the used manipulation check measure in the present experiment. 
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Similar to Experiment 1 and 2, the manipulation of ingroup member humiliation was 
successful as results of the two-way analyses of variance confirmed the success of the ingroup 
member humiliation manipulation as the experimental condition of ingroup member humiliation 
had a significant effect on the ingroup member humiliation manipulation check, F(1, 271) = 
490.01, p < .001, ƞp2 = .64. Participants in the high ingroup member humiliation condition (M = 
4.36, SD = 0.74, n = 138) scored significantly higher on the manipulation check of ingroup 
member humiliation than participants in the low ingroup member humiliation condition (M = 
1.82, SD = 1.13, n = 137). Ingroup identification had a marginal effect on the dependent variable, 
F(1, 271) = 3.99, p = .047, ƞp2 = .014, and the interaction between the ingroup member 
humiliation and ingroup identification did not reach statistical significance, F(1, 271) = 1.66, p = 
.198, ƞp2 = .006. These results support the success of the ingroup member humiliation 
manipulations in Experiment 3  
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 14 summarises the means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-
correlations of all assessed variables. As in Experiment 2, the descriptive statistics (see Table 14) 
revealed that there was a significant correlation between group-based humiliation and the 
ingroup member manipulation check. Also, as in Experiment 2, group-based humiliation 
correlated significantly, but moderately, to susceptibility to feelings of humiliation. In the current 
experiment, ingroup identification manipulation check correlated significantly with group-based 
humiliation, yet moderately. The second criterion of the intergroup emotion theory seems to hold 
true that group-based emotions relate to the level of identification with the ingroup (Smith et al., 
2007). The ingroup identification manipulation check also correlated moderately with anger and 
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revenge. Anger, as well as shame correlated significantly with group-based humiliation which 
again is in line with the findings in Experiment 2. Withdrawal did not correlate significantly with 
group-based humiliation, but the revenge response did. In the present experiment there was a 
significant correlation between anger and revenge and also between shame and withdrawal, as 
was seen in Experiment 2. Different from Experiment 2, perceived prototypicality had a 
significant relationship with anger but similar to Experiment 2, it also correlated significantly 
with group-based humiliation. 
 89 
  
Table 14. The means, standard deviations, number of participants and inter-correlations of the assessed variables, Experiment 3 
 1 Group-
based 
humiliation 
2 Anger 
response 
3 Shame 
response 
4 
Withdrawal 
response 
5 
Revenge 
response 
6 Ingroup 
identification 
manipulation 
check 
7 Ingroup 
member 
humiliation 
manipulation 
check 
8 Perceived 
prototypicality 
9 Perceived 
ingroup 
variability 
10 
Susceptibility 
to feelings of 
humiliation 
Mean 3.10 2.37 1.80 2.63 3.18 3.88 3.09 4.46 4.41 2.74 
SD 1.50 1.23 1.02 0.96 1.13 1.18 1.59 2.11 0.69 0.94 
n 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 254 276 276 
1  .637** .437** .047 .476** .283** .863** .247** -.172** .222** 
2   .632** .126* .495** .243** .627** .236** -.109 .277** 
3    .263** .283** .144* .373** .109 -.127* .298** 
4     .106 -.164** .017 .022 -.013 .191** 
5      .240** .485** .221** -.052 .219** 
6       .264** .112 -.037 .028 
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Note: ** correlation significant at p < .01 level, * correlation significant at p < .05 level 
 
7        .201** -.124* .174** 
8        . .041 -.019 
9         -.004 .102 
10          .023 
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Hypotheses Testing 
The role of ingroup identification 
The first aim of the third experiment was to test Hypothesis 2, namely that high identified 
participants experience more group-based humiliation than low identifiers. As outlined in the 
preliminary analysis, the manipulation check for ingroup identification revealed that participants 
in the high and moderate identification conditions did not differ significantly in their 
identification with women as ingroup. It was decided, however, to test for the impact of ingroup 
identification given that the means of both experimental conditions pointed into the expected 
direction. Therefore, two-way between-groups analysis of variance (two-way ANOVA) was 
performed on group-based humiliation with ingroup identification and ingroup member 
humiliation entered as independent variables. Perceived prototypicality of the ingroup member, 
perceived ingroup variability and susceptibility to feelings of humiliation were included as 
covariates.  
Ingroup member humiliation had a significant main effect on group-based humiliation, 
F(1, 246) = 231.659, p < .01, ƞp2 = .48. Participants in the low ingroup member humiliation 
condition (M = 2.06, σx̅ = 0.09) felt less group-based humiliation than participants in the high 
ingroup member humiliation condition (M = 4.07, σx̅ = 0.09). These results indicate that it was 
possible for the participants to experience group-based humiliation on behalf of the humiliated 
ingroup member in the scenario presented to them. Ingroup identification did not have a 
significant main effect on the dependent variable, F(1, 246) = 0.77, p = .382, ƞp2 = .00. There 
was no significant interaction between the two independent variables, F(1, 246) = .19, p = .659, 
ƞp2 = .00. Perceived prototypicality of the ingroup member, F(1, 246) = 7.00, p = .009, ƞp2  = .03, 
perceived ingroup variability, F(1, 246) = 4.52, p = .034, ƞp2  = .02 and susceptibility to feelings 
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of humiliation F(1, 246) = 14.73, p < .01, ƞp2  = .06 were all significant covariates.9 Table 14 
indicates the estimated marginal means of group-based humiliation across the four experimental 
conditions (prototypicality of ingroup member, susceptibility to humiliation and perceived 
ingroup variability added as covariates).  
 
Table 15. Estimated marginal means and standard errors of group-based humiliation 
across the four conditions with perceived prototypicality, susceptibility to humiliation 
and perceived ingroup variability as covariates, Experiment 3 
 Level of ingroup member humiliation 
  Low High 
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 Means Std. Error Means Std. Error 
Moderate 1.97 0.13 4.04 0.12 
High 2.15 0.13 4.10 0.13 
 
Responses to humiliation 
Another aim of Experiment 3 was to replicate the findings of Experiment 2 with regard to 
the emotional and behavioural responses to group-based humiliation. As in Experiment 2 it was 
hypothesised that the relationship between group-based humiliation and revenge is mediated via 
                                                          
9 An additional analysis of variance was performed without including the covariates into the model. Ingroup member 
humiliation had a significant main effect on group-based humiliation, F(1,271) = 260.07, p < .001, ƞp2 = .490. 
Ingroup identification did not have a significant main effect, F(1, 271) = 0.96, p = .328, ƞp2 = .004 and there was no 
significant interaction effect either, F(1, 271) = 0.56, p = .454, ƞp2 = .002. 
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anger but not shame (Hypothesis 3) whereas the relationship between group-based humiliation 
and withdrawal is mediated via shame but not anger (Hypothesis 4). To test these hypotheses, the 
same two mediation models as used in Experiment 2 were conducted with group-based 
humiliation (measured variable) as independent variable, shame and anger as parallel mediators 
and revenge or withdrawal behaviour as dependent variables (see Figure 1 and 2, Experiment 2). 
Revenge model 
The revenge model was again tested using Process (Hayes, 2013) and the bootstrapping 
method with 10000 iterations. The detailed results are reported in Table 15. The overall model 
explained 29.10% of variance of the dependent variable revenge. As in Experiment 2, the results 
of the specific indirect effects indicate that anger but not shame mediates the relationship 
between group-based humiliation and revenge. Again, the more conservative normal theory test 
supports this interpretation for both, anger, Z = 4.430, p < .01, and shame, Z = -0.981, p = .326. 
Again, group-based humiliation had a direct effect on revenge when the emotional responses 
were controlled which replicates the findings of Experiment 2 that the anger partially mediates 
this relationship. 10  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10A mediation-moderation model was tested using Process (Hayes, 2013) where group-based humiliation (measured 
variable) was added as independent variable, anger as mediator, prototypicality as moderator and revenge as 
dependent variable. Results showed that the interaction between group-based humiliation and prototypicality on 
revenge reached statistical significance, t(4, 249) = -2.064, σx̅ = 0.020, p = .040.  
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Table 16. Total, direct and indirect effect of group-based humiliation on revenge behaviour, 
Experiment 3 
 B SE p 
Group-based 
humiliation on anger 
.526 0.038 .000 
Group-based 
humiliation on shame 
.299 0.037 .000 
Direct effects of 
anger on revenge 
.333 .071 .000 
Direct effects of 
shame on revenge 
-.073 0.073 .320 
Total effect of group-
based humiliation on 
revenge 
.362 0.040 .000 
Direct effect of 
group-based 
humiliation on 
revenge 
 
.209 0.050 .000 
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Model Summary for 
DV Model 
R2 = .2910, F (3,272) = 37.22, p < .01 
 B Boot SE [Boot LLCI, Boot 
ULCI] 
Indirect Effect of 
anger (using 95% 
bias corrected 
confidence interval  
.175 0.037 [.1022, .2522] 
Indirect Effect of 
shame using 95% 
bias corrected 
confidence interval 
-.022 0.020 [-.0671, .0137] 
 
Withdrawal model 
The withdrawal model was conducted using Process (Hayes, 2013) as well as the 
bootstrapping method with 10000 iterations. Withdrawal behaviour was entered as dependent 
variable while group-based humiliation (measured variable) and shame/anger were entered as 
independent and mediator variables. The overall model explained 7.5% of the dependent variable 
withdrawal. The detailed results are reported in Table 16. Similar to Experiment 2, the results of 
the specific indirect specific effects showed that shame but not anger mediated the relationship 
between group-based humiliation and withdrawal. The normal theory tests support these findings 
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in that shame was statistically significant, Z = 3.636, p < .01, but not anger, Z = -0.266, p = .789. 
Again, the missing direct effect of group-based humiliation on withdrawal suggests that this 
relationship was fully mediated by shame.11 
 
Table 17. Total, direct and indirect effect of group-based humiliation on withdrawal, Experiment 
3  
 B SE p 
Group-based 
humiliation on anger 
.525 0.038 .000 
Group-based 
humiliation on shame 
.299 0.037 .000 
Direct effects of 
anger on withdrawal 
-.018 0.069 .789 
Direct effects of 
shame on withdrawal 
 
 
.291 0.071 .000 
                                                          
11 A mediation-moderation model was tested using Process (Hayes, 2013) where group-based humiliation (measured 
variable) was added as independent variable, shame as mediator, prototypicality as moderator and withdrawal as 
dependent variable. Results showed that there was no significant interaction between group-based humiliation and 
prototypicality on withdrawal, t(4, 249) = -0.551, σx̅ = 0.019, p = .582. 
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Total effect of group-
based humiliation on 
withdrawal 
.030 0.039 .432 
Direct effect of 
group-based 
humiliation on 
withdrawal 
-.047 0.049 .337 
Model Summary for 
DV Model 
R2 = .075, F (3,272) = 7.35, p < .01 
 B Boot SE [Boot LLCI, Boot 
ULCI] 
Indirect Effect of 
anger (using 95% 
bias corrected 
confidence interval  
-.009 0.039 [-.0887, .0648] 
Indirect Effect of 
shame using 95% 
bias corrected 
confidence interval 
.087 0.025 [.0422, .1399] 
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Discussion 
Experiment 3 aimed to study the role of ingroup identification in the experience of group-
based humiliation as the intergroup emotion theory proposes that group-based emotions are 
related to the level of ingroup identification (Smith et al., 2007). The current experiment 
hypothesised that high identifiers will experience more group-based humiliation than low 
identifiers (Hypothesis 3). Ingroup identification and ingroup member humiliation were each 
manipulated on two levels in a two-by-two factorial design. Although, the results of the 
manipulation check for ingroup identification questioned the success that participants’ ingroup 
identification was successfully manipulated, it was decided to test the impact of ingroup 
identification since the measures pointed into the expected direction. The results however 
showed that ingroup identification did not have a significant main effect on group-based 
humiliation. There was also no significant interaction between ingroup identification and ingroup 
member humiliation suggesting that the level of group-based humiliation experienced by 
participants in the low and high ingroup member humiliation conditions did seemingly not 
depend on the level of ingroup identification. Thus Hypothesis 3 could not be confirmed in 
Experiment 3. It is however important to note that the results of the manipulation check showed 
that the ingroup identification manipulation for the present experiment was not successful and 
the interpretation of the results should be accepted with caution.  
The second aim of Experiment 3 was to replicate the findings regarding the responses to 
group-based humiliation, found in Experiment 2. Results replicated the findings of Experiment 2 
and supported Hypotheses 3 and 4, as it was found that group-based humiliation directly 
predicted revenge, and that this relationship was partially mediated by anger but not by shame 
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whereas the relationship between group-based humiliation and withdrawal was fully mediated by 
shame but not by anger.  
 
General Discussion 
The overall aim of the present research project was to extend our understanding of 
intergroup emotions, in particular humiliation. The present research tested experimentally the 
possibility that this negative, self-conscious emotion can be experienced as a group-based 
emotion, that is, on behalf of an ingroup member who is humiliated by an outgroup. 
Furthermore, the present study tested the emotional and behavioural responses to group-based 
humiliation. More specifically, based on the intergroup emotion theory (Smith et al., 2007) four 
hypotheses were proposed. The intergroup emotion theory proposes that group-level emotions 
are distinct from personal-level emotions. Based on this assumption, the present study 
hypothesised that the experience of humiliation on a personal-level is independent from the 
experience of humiliation on a group-level (Hypothesis 1). The theory further suggests that 
group-level emotions depend on the degree of group identification. In line with this, the second 
hypothesis of the present study proposed that participants who identify highly with the ingroup 
will experience more group-based humiliation than low identifiers (Hypothesis 2). The 
intergroup emotion theory also proposes that group-level emotions motivate and regulate 
intragroup and intergroup attitudes and behaviour. In line with this assumption and related 
research, the present study further hypothesised that the relationship between group-based 
humiliation and revengeful behaviour is mediated via anger but not shame (Hypothesis 3) 
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whereas the relationship between group-based humiliation and withdrawal is mediated via shame 
but not anger (Hypothesis 4). 
The first hypothesis was tested in Experiment 1 and 2. Results from the two experiments 
supported the hypothesis. First, in both experiments ingroup member humiliation had a 
significant main effect on direct group humiliation as well as on group-based humiliation as 
dependent variables. Secondly, there was neither a significant main effect of personal 
humiliation nor an interaction effect between personal and ingroup member humiliation on the 
dependent variables. The latter suggests that personal and group-based humiliation are indeed 
distinct experiences. The results further indicated that it is possible for the participants to 
experience humiliation on behalf of a humiliated ingroup member supporting the findings of 
Veldhuis et al. (2014). It is however important to note that the present experiments did not 
measure personal humiliation. Consequently, in order to confirm that personal humiliation is 
truly independent from group-level humiliation future studies should empirically test that 
humiliation on a personal level but not humiliation on a group level predicts the experience of 
personal humiliation, whereby humiliation on a group-level but not humiliation on a personal 
level predicts the experience of group-based humiliation as demonstrated in the present 
experiments.  
The second hypothesis of the present research assumed that participants who highly 
identify with their ingroup will experience more group-based humiliation than participants who 
less identify with their ingroup. In Experiment 1 and 2 ingroup identification was assessed as a 
covariate and results of these experiments regarding ingroup identification were rather 
ambiguous. In Experiment 1 ingroup identification had no significant effect on group-level 
humiliation, yet in Experiment 2 it exerted a significant main effect on the dependent variables. 
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Consequently, in Experiment 3 it was decided to test ingroup identification more directly by 
treating it as an independent variable. Results of Experiment 3 could not support the hypothesis. 
First, although the measure of ingroup identification pointed into the expected directions the 
manipulation check revealed no significant differences indicating that the manipulation of 
ingroup identification was not successful in Experiment 3. Secondly, ingroup identification did 
not have a significant main or interaction effect on group-based humiliation. Given the fact that 
the successful manipulation of ingroup identification was not confirmed the results and their 
interpretation should be accepted with caution because the results might be due to a 
methodological issue in the third experiment and not due to the fact that ingroup identification 
does not play a role in group-based humiliation. 
Hypothesis 3 and 4 addressed the responses of humiliation by stating that the relationship 
between group-based humiliation and revengeful behaviour is mediated via anger but not shame 
(Hypothesis 3) whereas the relationship between group-based humiliation and withdrawal is 
mediated via shame but not anger (Hypothesis 4).  Experiment 2 and 3 supported both 
hypotheses as the results indicated that the relationship between group-based humiliation and 
revenge was mediated by anger, whereas the relationship between group-based humiliation and 
withdrawal was mediated by shame. Anger partially mediated the relationship between group-
based humiliation and revenge, while the relationship between group-based humiliation and 
withdrawal was fully mediated via shame. Moreover, results of the variances explained in the 
revenge model was larger in both experiments when compared to the variance explained in the 
withdrawal model. However, the results of both models suggest that there are a range of other 
factors involved predicting either revenge or withdrawal as response to group-based humiliation. 
Worth to note is that revenge was predicted by anger as mediator but also directly by group-
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based humiliation. This pattern could be caused by two possible factors. On the one hand, it 
could be that revenge as response to group-based humiliation is perceived as normative which 
therefore does not require accommodating emotions as motivational regulators. On the other 
hand, it could be that the measure of revenge used in the present research actually represents 
retaliation rather than revenge which again does not require accommodating emotions, such as 
anger, as motivational regulators. Future research should address this issue by clarifying whether 
particular behavioural responses to group-based humiliation are socially shared as normative and 
whether the normativity of responses affects the role of accommodating emotions as 
motivational regulators.  
As the present experiments controlled for possible covariates for explorative reasons, an 
additional result with reference to the covariates should be noted. Susceptibility to feelings of 
humiliation was a significant covariate in all three experiments and it can therefore be concluded 
that how susceptible participants were to humiliation in the present experiments had an effect on 
their experience of humiliation. Results of the other covariates were rather ambiguous. How 
prototypical participants perceived the humiliated ingroup member to be (controlled for in 
Experiment 2 and 3) did not play a role in Experiment 2 as perceived prototypicality did not have 
a significant effect on either of the dependent variables. Yet, in Experiment 3 it did have a main 
effect on the experience of group-based humiliation and it correlated significantly with anger and 
revenge. Perceived ingroup variability (controlled for in all three experiments) did not have a 
main effect on the dependent variables in Experiment 1 and 2, but how different participants 
perceived ingroup members to be seemed to have played a role in Experiment 3 as it was a 
significant covariate on the experience of group-based humiliation. Future research on group-
based humiliation should further study the role of perceived prototypicality of the humiliated 
 103 
  
ingroup member, as well as the role of perceived ingroup variability, as results pertaining to 
these two covariates were vague in the present experiments. 
Although, the present research extended our understating of group-based emotions in 
general and group-based humiliation in particular, the results need to be read in conjunction with 
the obvious limitations of the three experimental studies. The first limitation is that all three 
experiments were internet-based studies. This methodological approach made it impossible to 
control for the circumstances under which the participants completed the experiments. For 
instance, the present experiments did and could not control the present mood of the participants 
when participating in the research. The experiments did and could not control whether 
participants just experienced any form of humiliation before starting with the experiment. It was 
also not possible to control whether participants completed the experiment on their own and at 
once. Therefore, it might be advisable to conduct future research on group-based humiliation as 
laboratory experiments which represent a more controlled setting.  
Secondly, although convenience sampling was used for the present experiments, it has to 
be noted that the response rate of the participants (1.8%) was low compared to the amount of 
participants who were invited to participate. This was mainly caused by two factors. Firstly, 
students registered at the University of South Africa do not open their university email inboxes 
as often compared to their personal email inboxes. Secondly, the policy of the University of 
South Africa does not allow for incentives, such as a lucky draw, to be given to participants 
which reduce the willingness to participate in studies (Leung, Ho, Chan, Johnston, & Wong, 
2002). 
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The third limitation refers to the measurements used in the present research project. 
Although almost all measurements showed good reliabilities, the measure of ingroup variability 
did not. Ingroup variability was assessed by two items previously used by Doosje et al. (1998). It 
was decided to include a third item in order to improve the validity of this measure. However, 
the added item did not contribute to the improvement of the measure in any of the three 
experiments. Future studies might address this limitation by developing a multi-item scale to 
assess ingroup variability. Another limitation regarding the measurements involves the items 
used to measure the revenge response. Although the two items used were treated as assessing 
‘revenge’, it should be noted that these two items represented a relatively mild form that might 
represent retaliation rather than revenge. However, the items were considered as appropriate 
responses to the context used in the ingroup member humiliation manipulation which did not 
represent a ‘severe’ humiliation situation as it was perceived as unethical.  
The fifth limitation refers to the manipulation of ingroup identification which was not 
successful. The fact that the ingroup identification manipulation used in Experiment 3 was not 
successful might be because a real social group was used. Manipulating the level of ingroup 
identification with an established group that already has a baseline identification with their 
ingroup seems to be methodologically difficult (Clinton, 2008) particularly when this ingroup is 
perceived as an important part of the participants’ social identity which can be assumed for 
gender identity such as being “female”. It might be therefore advisable for future research to 
make use of experimentally created social groups when testing the second hypothesis in a future 
study. Experimentally created groups, or minimal groups, do not have a history of interactions 
and this might make it easier to manipulate the level of identification (Doosje et al., 1995). 
Alternatively, participants might also be given physiological feedback regarding their level of 
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identification when manipulating ingroup identification as demonstrated by Doosje et al. (1998). 
Another possibility is to treat ingroup identification as a moderator and measure it before 
conducting the experiment when using real social groups (Giguère, Lalonde, & Taylor, 2014).  
Lastly, a major limitation of the present research project might be the fact that all 
experiments used the same intergroup context, namely gender. The decision to use the very same 
inter-group context in the present experiments was informed by the aim to exclude impact of 
various intergroup contexts as possible factor influencing the results of the present research. 
Notwithstanding, using the very same intergroup context has its limitations and therefore future 
experiments testing the same hypotheses should be conducted using other social groups, such as 
nationality or race, in order to make the results of the present study more valid. 
Limitations aside, the present research project contributed to various research areas. 
Results of all three experiments contribute to our understanding of intergroup emotions. The 
intergroup emotion theory (Smith et al., 2007) has been tested for group-based anger (Garcia et 
al., 2006; Gordijn & Yzerbyt, 2006), group-based guilt (Doosje et al., 1998) and group-based 
shame (Lickel et al., 2005). The present study contributed to the intergroup emotion theory and 
its criteria by showing that this theory is also suitable for testing group-based humiliation. 
The present research also contributed to the scarce literature on group-based humiliation 
by first adding evidence to the study conducted by Veldhuis et al. (2014) by showing that it is 
possible to experience humiliation on behalf of another ingroup member and secondly, by 
investigating its emotional and behavioural consequences. The present study further showed that 
it is not only the antecedent of exclusion that can lead to group-based humiliation (Otten & 
Jonas, 2013; Veldhuis et al., 2014), but also the antecedents of disrespect and lowered status.  
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The intergroup emotion theory suggests that group-level emotions motivate and regulate 
intragroup and intergroup attitudes and behaviour. Previous studies have demonstrated that 
emotions, and in particular group-level emotions, lead to behavioural responses (Doosje, 
Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006; Frijda et al., 1989; Mackie et al., 2000) as suggested by 
the appraisal theory of emotion (Frijda et al., 1989). In line with this, the present study showed 
that group-based humiliation also leads to certain responses by providing an explanation for the 
different pathways individuals may take when reacting to group-based humiliation. The present 
research replicated the findings of previous research on the emotional and behavioural responses 
of humiliation experienced on a group-level. Previous research revealed that group-level 
humiliation leads to either anger or shame (Leidner et al., 2012) and consequently to revenge or 
withdrawal (van Driel, 2011). Van Driel (2011) and Leidner et al. (2012) found that as anger 
increased, so did the tendency to engage in revengeful behaviour. The present study replicated 
these findings by showing that anger significantly mediated the relationship between group-
based humiliation and revenge. Also, the observed direct effect of group-based humiliation on 
revenge tendencies in the present study is consistent with the research from Hartling et al. (2013) 
and Elison and Harter (2007) which link humiliation directly to retaliation. The present study 
showed that group-based humiliation may directly and indirectly via anger lead to engage in 
vengeful behaviour.  
The present study also showed that for an individual to react to group-based humiliation 
with withdrawal, s/he first needs to feel shame as a consequence of the humiliating event. Shame 
is typically felt when individuals perceive themselves to be inferior to others and when they 
judge themselves negatively (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). In line with this, the 
present study showed that when participants reacted with shame it might have been because they 
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perceived their ingroup of women as inferior to the outgroup of men. This explanation is 
supported by the observed pattern seen in Experiment 1 and 2 that participants randomly 
allocated to the low personal and low ingroup member humiliation condition still scored 
relatively high on the measures of humiliation. These results might offer insight into the South 
African context concerning males and females. Even when females were asked about a neutral 
interaction with males, it still seemingly triggered humiliation in them. Perhaps a history of 
interactions with males involve humiliating situations for females as South Africa is a society 
where status differences between males and females still exist for the majority of South African 
women (Oliphant, 2015). 
Another contribution of the present research project that is important to note is that the 
ineffective attempt to manipulate ingroup identification in the third experiment demonstrated that 
it seems challenging to manipulate the level of ingroup identification of an established group like 
gender. This inability to manipulate ingroup identification adds evidence to a study conducted by 
Clinton (2008) in that the attempt to manipulate the level of identification with the university that 
was used as ingroup, also proved unsuccessful. When there is already a baseline identification 
with an existing social group, manipulating the level of identification proves to be difficult 
(Clinton, 2008) and thus it might not be as effective as using a newly created experimental group 
(Doosje et al., 1995).  
A last contribution to note is that although the present research project used the 
intergroup context of gender in all experiments, this study might be relevant to all intergroup 
contexts as it showed that it is indeed possible to experience humiliation on behalf of a 
humiliated ingroup member. In a context like South Africa, directly humiliating individuals 
because of his/her race or culture seems to happen often, especially in social media domains 
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(Feltham, 2016; Wicks, 2016). As this study has shown, other members of the ingroup will 
experience the humiliation on behalf of the humiliated members and respond with negative 
emotions and behaviours. In order to resolve intergroup conflict in a context like South Africa, 
and other countries as well, more research is needed in understanding the dynamics behind the 
conflict and in particular the causes and consequences of group-based humiliation. The present 
research can be considered as a further contribution (Combs et al., 2010; Jonas et al., 2014; 
McCarley, 2009; Otten & Jonas, 2014; van Driel, 2011; Veldhuis et al., 2014) to the 
understanding and knowledge of this seemingly complex emotion. 
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Appendix A 
Pilot Study 
The aim of the pilot study was to test the appropriateness of the experimental 
manipulations of personal and ingroup member humiliation, and the measurements of the 
dependent variables, manipulation checks and covariates for Experiment 1. 
 Sample 
A total of 51 black female students registered at the College of Education at the 
University of South Africa participated in the pilot study. Forty participants indicated how old 
they were. Their age ranged from 19 to 46 (Mage = 29.25). All participants indicated that they are 
South African and that they resided in South Africa. Only two participants identified the true aim 
of the experiment by suggesting that the study was looking at humiliation and disrespect. The 
other 49 participants indicated that the aim of the study was about the role of gender in our 
society. The 49 participants were distributed to the four experimental conditions as outlined in 
Table 19. 
Table 19. Number of participants in the four experimental conditions 
                                               Level of ingroup member humiliation 
Level of personal humiliation low high 
low n = 14 n = 12 
high n = 11 n = 12 
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Measurements 
Reliabilities 
All measures were presented on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 5 (strongly agree). Participants were instructed to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed 
with each item by choosing the most appropriate answer. If not differently stated, all items of the 
respective scales were randomly presented to the participants. 
Dependent variables 
The present study distinguished two measures of humiliation as dependent variable. The 
first measure is direct group humiliation, which is being directly humiliated purely because an 
individual is a member of a group as described by Neuhauser (2011). The second measure is 
group-based humiliation, that is feeling humiliated on behalf of an ingroup member humiliated 
by an outgroup. This type of group humiliation is termed representative group humiliation by 
Neuhauser (2011). Both scales consisted of five items. For the development of both scales, the 
cognitive appraisals or antecedents that elicit humiliation were used. Concepts from the 
Humiliation Inventory (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999) that measures personal humiliation were also 
taken into consideration and adapted for the present study. The five items included in the scale 
that measured participants’ feelings of being directly humiliated as member of the ingroup by the 
outgroup were: “As a woman, I feel disrespected by the behaviour that men show towards 
women”; “As a woman, I feel that my dignity is violated by the behaviour that men show 
towards women”; “As a woman, I feel humiliated by the behaviour that men show towards 
women”; “As a woman, I feel that I am not recognised as equal by the behaviour that men show 
towards women”; “As a woman, I feel devalued by the behaviour that men show towards 
women”. The five items measuring direct group humiliation formed a reliable scale (α = .93). 
 119 
  
The Corrected Item-Total correlations showed that all five items strongly correlated with the 
total scale (rs > .60).  
The five items that measured the participants’ feelings or experiences of group-based 
humiliation were: “As a woman, I feel disrespected by the behaviour that the male interviewers 
showed towards Thandeka”; “As a woman, I feel that my dignity is violated by the behaviour 
that the male interviewers showed towards Thandeka”; “As a woman, I feel humiliated by the 
behaviour that the male interviewers showed towards Thandeka”; “As a woman, I feel not 
recognised as equal by the behaviour that the male interviewers showed towards Thandeka”; “As 
a woman, I feel devalued by the behaviour that the male interviewers showed towards 
Thandeka”. These five items also formed a reliable scale (α = .92). Again, the Corrected Item-
Total correlations indicated that all five items strongly correlated with the total scale (rs > .60). 
Given the reliabilities it was decided to use these two measures in Experiment 1.  
Manipulation check measures 
Three items were developed to check if the manipulation for ingroup member humiliation 
was successful: “During Thandeka’s interview, she was fairly treated as a woman by the male 
interviewers” (reversed); “During Thandeka’s interview, she was humiliated by the behaviour of 
the male interviewers”; and “During Thandeka’s interview, she was disrespected”. This scale 
reached a Cronbach’s of .68. The item analysis revealed that the Corrected Item-Total 
correlations indicated that the reversed item weakly correlated with the total scale (r < .30).  
For the manipulation check of personal humiliation, the following three items were used:  
“In my recent interaction with a man or men that I wrote about, I feel that I was fairly treated by 
him/them” (reversed); “In my recent interaction with a man or men that I wrote about, I feel that 
I was humiliated by him/them”; and “In my recent interaction that I wrote about, I feel that I was 
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disrespected”. The Cronbach’s alpha was .84 and all items correlated strongly with the total scale 
according to the Corrected Item-Total correlations (rs > .5).  
Given the rather low reliability of the manipulation check scale of ingroup member 
humiliation it was decided to rephrase all reversed items of the manipulation checks for 
Experiment 1. 
Covariates  
Ingroup identification was measured using items based on the scale developed by Leach 
et al. (2008). Ten items were selected for the present study: “I feel strong bonds with women”; “I 
feel committed to women”; “I am glad to be a woman”; “I think that women have a lot to be 
proud of”; “I often think about the fact that I am a woman”; “Being a woman is an important part 
of how I see myself”; “I have a lot in common with the average woman”; “I am similar to the 
average woman”; “Women have a lot in common with each other”; “Women are very similar to 
each other” (α = .75). The Corrected Item-Total correlation indicated that nine of the ten  items 
correlated strongly with the total scale (rs > .30). Only one item (“I often think about the fact that 
I am a woman”) correlated rather weakly (r = .28). However, the overall reliability did not 
improve when excluding this item. It was therefore decided to measure ingroup identification 
with all 10 items in Experiment 1. 
Perceived ingroup variability was measured using three items. Two items were adapted 
from Doosje et al. (1998): “Women are not all alike” and “Women differ from each other”.  A 
third item was added to improve the reliability of the scale: “Not all women should be treated the 
same way” (α = .55). The Corrected Item-Total correlation showed the item (“Not all women 
should be treated the same way”) correlated weakly with the total scale (r = .181). Removing this 
item from the scale resulted in a reliability value of r = .85, p < .001. Although the added item 
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seemed not to improve the reliability of the scale, it was decided to retain the item in order to 
collect more empirical evidence about its usefulness or non-usefulness in the scale. Therefore, it 
was decided to use all three items for the perceived ingroup variability measure in Experiment 1. 
Susceptibility to feelings of humiliation was measured using five items based on the 
antecedents of humiliation. These items were developed for the present research project in line 
with the Humiliation Inventory (Hartling & Luchetta, 1999). Susceptibility to feelings of 
humiliation was measured at a general level and therefore not tailored to a specific intergroup 
context. The items were: “In general, I easily feel humiliated”; “I often feel disrespected”; 
“Often, I do not feel recognised by others”; “I often feel devalued as a person”; and “Often, I feel 
that my dignity is violated by other people” (α = .90). The Corrected Item-Total correlation 
indicated that all items correlated strongly with the total scale (rs > .70). 
As the three covariate measures formed reliable scales it was decided to use these 
measures in Experiment 1. 
 
Manipulation checks 
An independent samples t-test with personal humiliation (low versus high) and ingroup 
member humiliation (low versus high) as independent variables was conducted on the two 
manipulation checks. The t-test of the personal humiliation manipulation check showed that 
participants in the high personal humiliation conditions (M = 4.40, SD = 0.77, n = 18) scored 
significantly higher on the manipulation check of personal humiliation than participants in the 
low personal humiliation conditions (M = 3.04, SD = 1.40, n = 24), t = 3.97, p < .01, ƞp2 = 0.51.  
This means that participants appraised the event that they described as more humiliating in the 
high personal humiliation condition than in the low personal humiliation condition. Similar 
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results were found for the ingroup member humiliation manipulation check. The results of the 
independent samples t-test showed that participants in the high ingroup member humiliation 
conditions (M = 4.50, SD = 0.68, n = 21) scored significantly higher on the manipulation check 
than participants in the low ingroup member humiliation conditions (M = 3.10, SD = 1.30, n = 
21), t = 4.42, p < .01, ƞp2 = 0.56. This means that participants perceived the ingroup member as 
more humiliated in the high ingroup member humiliation condition than in the low ingroup 
member humiliation condition. The results of the manipulation checks confirmed the success of 
the personal and ingroup member humiliation manipulations in the current pilot experiment. It 
was therefore decided to apply the manipulations in Experiment 1. The results of the pilot study 
also showed that participants who were allocated to the low personal and ingroup member 
humiliation conditions scored relatively high on both manipulation check measures. It might 
have been that the answering format of the scale centre (“neither agree nor disagree”) was 
actually construed by the participants as “no humiliation”. To avoid that the participants 
misconstrued the scale centre of the manipulation checks the answering format was changed 
from a scale measuring agreement/disagreement including a scale centre of “neither/nor 
agreement/disagreement” to a scale measuring different levels of agreement: (1) “not at all”; (2) 
“slightly”; (3) “somewhat”; (4) “very”; (5) “extremely”. 
 
Dependent variables 
Table 20 reports the estimated marginal means and standard errors of the dependent 
variables for the four experimental conditions. Given the small sample size we sustained from 
conducting any further statistical analyses.  
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Table 20. Estimated marginal means and standard errors of direct group humiliation and group-
based humiliation as dependent variables 
  Level of ingroup member humiliation 
   Low High 
L
ev
el
 o
f 
p
er
so
n
al
 h
u
m
il
ia
ti
o
n
   Means Std. Error Means Std. Error 
Low direct 3.51 0.24 4.38 0.26 
 
group-
based 
2.90 0.24 4.63 0.26 
High direct 3.74 0.27 4.40 0.26 
 
 
group-
based 
3.32 0.27 4.28 0.26 
 
Participants who were allocated to the low personal and ingroup member humiliation 
conditions scored relatively high on both the direct and group-based humiliation measures. 
Again it might have been that the answering format of the scale centre (“neither agree nor 
disagree”) was construed by the participants as “no humiliation”. Therefore, the answering 
format for the two dependent variables was changed as well from an agreement/disagreement 
scale including a scale centre of “neither/nor agreement/disagreement” to an answering format 
measuring the level of feelings so that the scale centre indicated an average feeling of 
humiliation: (1) “clearly does not describe my feeling”; (2) “mostly does not describe my 
feeling”; (3) “somewhat describes my feeling”; (4) “mostly describes my feeling”; to (5) “clearly 
describes my feeling”.  
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Summary 
The aim of the pilot study was to test the appropriateness of the experimental manipulations 
of personal and ingroup member humiliation, and the measurements of the dependent variables, 
manipulation checks and covariates for Experiment 1. The results of the manipulation checks 
showed that the manipulation of personal humiliation was successful, as well as the manipulation 
of ingroup member humiliation. Consequently, it was decided that the same manipulations will 
be used in the first experiment. The analyses of the measurements of the dependent variables, 
manipulation checks and covariates resulted in the following: (1) to use all items of the respected 
scales in Experiment 1; (2) to rephrase all reversed items of the manipulation checks for 
Experiment 1; and (3) to change the answer formats of the manipulation check measures and the 
dependent variable measures from an agreement/disagreement scale to an answering format 
measuring different levels of agreement/feelings. 
